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ABSTRACT
Toward A Philosophy of Educational Computing
(December 1975)

Timothy 0. Martyn, B.A., Providence College
M.A., Trinity College, Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by:

Professor Howard A. Peelle

This document reflects the thinking of a practitioner in the area
of educational computing who has endeavored to place his trade within
the context of educational philosophy.

Being acutely aware of the

necessity to specify well-defined objectives for automated systems and
recognizing the potential within the computer for actually achieving
such objectives,

the author argues that the very desirability of the

objectives themselves should be given serious attention.

This imme¬

diately leads to contemplating those eternal questions surrounding
the purpose of education.

Therefore, it is the author’s contention,

and a primary theme of this document, that educators involved with
computerized systems formulate some conscious philosophy of educational
computing.

This philosophy of educational computing should be derived

from and consistent with some parent philosophy of education.

vi

The author acknowledges that the selection of a parent
philosophy of education from one of the many "isms” found in various
anthologies of educational philosophy, or perhaps the development of
one’s own unique philosophic position, is very much a matter of
personal predisposition.

However, upon considering much of the valid

criticism which has been leveled at educational computing, the author
adopts existentialism as his parent philosophy.

Illustrating that

educational computing can be compatible with an existential philosophy
of education is the second major theme of this paper.

The author

demonstrates this compatibility by an analysis of cybernetics (as the
science encompassing digital computing)

from an existential perspective

and argues that there are no intellectual inconsistencies in their
positions.

Furthermore, it is proposed that the existential educator

may utilize cybernetic insights in defense of his philosophic position.
The author concludes by specifying some recent research efforts
in the instructional applications of computers which display considerable
merit toward the realization of existential objectives.
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INTRODUCTION

The Author's Predisposition
The author of this document speaks of educational computing
as a practitioner actively involved in the design and implementation
of computerized systems within an academic environment.

More pre¬

cisely , he speaks as a practitioner who some years ago began to look
beyond the sphere of design and implementation and seriously ask
"WHY?" questions regarding the objectives of educational computing.
In pursuing answers to these questions, the professional literature
of the educational technologist was of little help.
It appears that, with the best of intentions, those involved
with educational computing have spent a disproportionate amount of
time and energy toward achieving goals on the assumption that such
goals were naturally worthy of realization.

As a group, educational

technologists have been guilty of a common sin which Charles Silberman
has specified as the central problem within American education and
labeled "mindlessness," namely, the failure of most educators to
"think seriously or deeply about the purposes and consequences of
education."

In sympathy with Silberman, and being acutely aware of

the powerful impact the computer is having on education, the author
states that the primary message of this document is to encourage
his colleagues to ponder the "WHY?" questions of education,
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especially regarding the uses of computers.

Specifically,

they are encouraged to develop some conscious "philosophy of
educational computing" derived from and consistent with a parent
philosophy of education.
In this paper a philosophy of educational computing based
upon Existentialism is advocated.

The reader is invited to

examine the author's rationale for selecting Existentialism as
the parent philosophy; hopefully,
persuasive.

the reader will find this to be

However, a recognition of the significance of estab¬

lishing some philosophical basis for educational computing is more
important than the selection of a particular philosophy.
(For instance,

the author would sincerely welcome the exposition of

an experimental philosophy of educational computing or a scholastic
philosophy of educational computing.)

This is not to say that the

selection of the parent philosophy is an arbitrary matter; it is
a vital issue, but not to be pursued here.

In this document,

the author, as a practitioner, reflects upon educational computing,
and then selects Existentialism as his parent philosophy of education.
The tenets of Existentialism are then axiomatic.

The intent of this

paper becomes the incorporation of educational computing within this
philosophy, not vice versa, where the "tail wagging the dog
phenomenon occurs and the technology dictates educational policy.
The intellectual challenge taken up by the author is the illustration

xi

that educational computing is not incompatible with an existential
education and,

furthermore, that by allowing the computer into

the classroom under certain circumstances, existential goals may be
more readily achieved.

The Audience
This paper is addressed to both the practitioner involved with
educational computing and the existential educator.

As a practitioner,

the author encourages his colleagues to become aware of the necessity
for some philosophical perspective, and advocates the merits of the
existential position.

As an educator sympathetic toward the existen¬

tial position, he encourages other existential educators to recognize
both the potential dangers inherent within educational computing and
the positive role the computer can play in promoting a creative,
humanistic educational environment.

In addressing both groups of

educators, the author specifies their common interests and recommends
that each group may benefit by recognizing the productive insights
generated by the academic efforts of the other.

An Overview
This paper can be perceived as an attempt at a productive
cross-fertilization of ideas and concepts proposed by two groups of
educators.

The first group consists of those educators who are

advocates of existentialism as a philosophy of education.

xii

The second

group consists of educators who are involved with educational
computing.

Accordingly, some background information on each

group is presented.
Chapter I presents an overview and historical account of
the computer as utilized within an academic setting.

Chapter III

is a brief description of existential philosophy and its educational
implications.

The reader who is familiar with either or both of

these topics may well omit the corresponding chapter(s).
The heart of this paper is contained in the remaining
three chapters, and its organization is quite straightforward.
In Chapter II,

the author indicates the absence of a philosophy of

educational computing and argues for the construction of such
a philosophy.

Chapter IV is the primary focal point of the paper.

Here the author examines the science of cybernetics as the theoretical
science which encompasses digital computing and attempts to convince
the reader that the philosophic insights provided by cybernetics are
not incompatible with the basic tenets of Existential philosophy.
Furthermore, it is proposed that the Existentialist may find cyber¬
netic insights useful in an intellectual defense of his position.
Chapter V concludes with an examination of specific educational policy
and practices pertaining to educational computing which the author
believes to be consistent with an existential education.
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Once I had brains, and a heart also;
so, having tried them both, I should
much rather have a heart.

- The Tin Woodman

CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The objective of this introductory chapter is to provide the
reader with an historical overview of the uses of computer technology
within an educational environment.

It will conclude with a brief

description of the current status and futuristic projections of this
topic.

A.

Educational Computing Defined
Throughout this paper the expression "educational computing"
will be used in the generic sense to represent any and all applica¬
tions of computer technology in the process of education.
sake of discussion,

For the

it is helpful to subdivide educational compu¬

ting into three categories, according to areas of application.
These are:

(1) Educational Research;

and

(3)

1.

Educational Research

(2) School Administration;

Instruction.

The trend toward quantification in educational research, as in
all social science research, has increased utilization of the com¬
puter in its most basic role, that of a most efficient and accurate
calculating device.

The computer’s ability to process large amounts
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of data according to predefined sequences has made the educa¬
tional researcher evermore dependent upon the computer.
He can now perform calculations which, prior to the advent of
the computer, would have been impractical due to the effort
involved.

The application of the computer as a calculating

tool within educational research has been the most successful
area of educational computing.

2.

School Administration
A school system is an organization and school administrators

need accurate and timely information about its status for effec¬
tive operation and management.

This is the area of data proces¬

sing where the impact of the computer has been nothing short of
revolutionary.

Although the automation of school data proces¬

sing has progressed slowly,

the computer is proving to be an

invaluable asset to school administrators.^

School systems

perform functions similar to those of business and industry in
such areas as accounting, budget development, inventory control,
and payroll.

School administrators have sought to automate

these procedures as well as others which are unique to school
administration.

For instance, class scheduling, standardized

test scoring, and grade and attendance reporting have been
successfully transferred to computerized systems.

The applica¬

tion of the computer within educational administration has
evolved without much controversy, barring the exception of
automated student personnel systems which evoke the privacy issue.
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3.

Instruction
Research and administration are secondary activities compared

to the fundamental purpose of schools:
the classroom.

educating students in

Here, too, the computer has the potential to become

a significant factor directly involved in the process of education.
This is the area of Computer Assisted Instruction (CAI).
Traditionally, CAI is conceived as a situation in which
the student interacts with a computer for a period of time and in
doing so obtains some new knowledge.

Most CAI systems have been

designed to fit the drill-and-practice or tutorial modes of instruc¬
tion.

Also, some CAI systems have employed simulation and gaming

techniques.

Whereas the applications of computers in educational

research and administration are relatively straightforward and well
on their way to maturity, the instructional applications of computers
are still in an embryonic stage.

The above classification of CAI

has a multitude of variations, and the educational community has
yet to determine which, if any, has merit within the education
process.

Early Perspectives of Educational Computing:

Promise and Problems

During the late 1950's, as the computer was entering the commercial
world, some educators and members of the computer industry became aware
of the potential applications of the computer within education.
Idealistic scenerios were developed calling for research teams
composed of educators and computer scientists to design computerized
systems which would revolutionize the schoolhouse.
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The motivation

A
for this endeavor on the part of the computer industry was
obvious—profit.

After prototype systems were developed,

every school system was seen as a potential customer.

Various

segments of the educational community also became enthusiastic
for different reasons.
School administrators and members of boards of education,
being especially sensitive to the rising costs of education,
envisioned the computer as a means of saving the taxpayers'
dollars.

Not only would the computer streamline the adminis-

trative functions, but it would also permit more efficient use
of teachers'
bilities.

time by freeing them from mundane clerical responsi¬

This could also include drill and practice sessions

which were time-consuming but did not require the skills of
a professional educator.

The hope was that the computer could

bring the same cost benefits to education that it was bringing
to business and industry.
Associated with the idea of utilizing the computer for
a more efficient allocation of the school's resources was the
notion that perhaps the entire management and operation of the
American school system should be modeled after the American business
enterprise system.

Advocates of this concept did not expect the

schools to turn a profit; however, they did feel that, given the
financial investment the American taxpayer placed into education,
the schools should at least be able to achieve their objectives.
Shortcomings of the schools were pointed out and comparisons
were made to the success of American business enterprise.

It was
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recommended that not only the computer be Incorporated in the
school systems but that school administrators begin to think
managers of a business concerned with efficiency of opera—
tion.

Thus the proposal to utilize computer technology was

broadened to mean the adoption of the "systems approach" by
educational administrators.^
Other educators who saw promise in the computer were propo¬
nents of programmed instruction, including those favoring indivi¬
dualized instruction, and educational psychologists favoring
behaviorism.^

They perceived computer technology as a means of

achieving their objectives.

Conventional CAI systems, presumably

implemented on large time-share computing systems, would be
superior to any other media used for programmed instruction,
would allow the individual student to proceed through the lesson
at his own pace, and would be behavioristic in that the student
must respond to a stimulus, systematically presented by the
computer.

The computer, if properly programmed by thoughtful

educators, could fulfill all these objectives and was seen as
a blessing for future generations of American students.
A last group of advocates of educational computing should be
mentioned for the sake of completeness.
lovers."

These were the "gadget

They are difficult to identify because they rationalized

their enthusiasm for the computer by articulating any or all of
the aforementioned reasons for use of the computer by educators.
They were either struck by the mystique of the computer or were
simply trying to fulfill some publishing quota.

The computer was not welcomed into the schoolhouse with
enthusiasm by all.

Many educators and social critics, especially

those who were disenchanted with the undesirable by-products of
technology and its negative influences on the social structure,
perceived the computer as a dehumanizing mechanism and thereby
claimed that it should be barred from the schoolhouse.

Such threats

associated with automation were especially acute during the 1950’s.
With the development of the computer the threat was extended beyond
blue-collar jobs into clerical areas.

Teacher unions were sensitive

to this situation and therefore tended to be critical towards
educational computing.

They articulated their criticism in terms

of its dehumanizing influences, but their altruistic motivation is
certainly open to debate.

Historical Events
Earlier in the previous decade, responding more to the promise
than the problems within educational computing, the computer industry
began exploring methods of developing the potentially lucrative
education market.

In order to establish marketing contact with

the nation's school systems and obtain personnel familiar with educa¬
tion, many computer manufacturers purchased educational publishing
houses;

i.e., International Business Machines purchased Science

Research Associates and General Electric purchased General Learning.
The major computer manufacturers also began to finance research into
educational computing in order to stimulate interest and awareness
on the part of educators..

Government and private foundation funding
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was also generous, and thus evolved a proliferation of pilot
projects in educational computing.
As was mentioned earlier, the applications of administrative
data processing and educational research proved to be successful,
and the fruits of this success are becoming evident in today's
academic institutions.

However, while initial evaluation of the

instructional applications of the computer has been positive,
it has not been conclusive.

Whereas the computer is now commonly

used in many schools to process clerical transactions, and is
being used as a calculating device in math and science courses,
its application as an instructional tool is still minimal.
Portia Elliott makes reference to the three major pilot
projects in the instructional applications of computers.^
She identifies Patrick Suppes of Stanford, Donald Blitzer of
the University of Illinois

(the PLATO project), and Kenneth

Stetten of the Mitre Corporation (the MITRE project) as three
cautious, yet strong, advocates of CAI who have spearheaded
research into instructional uses of the computer.

Elliott

proceeds to indicate some limitations of conventional CAI as
represented by these projects and makes reference to current
pilot projects which, though smaller in scope, are stimulating
and contain great promise.

Chapter V of this paper will examine

these applications in detail with reference to the philosophy
of educational computing to be developed.
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D.

Analysis
The objective of this section is to draw some general obser¬
vations pertinent to the brief history of educational computing.
Much of what will be said will be derived from the one truly
comprehensive analysis of this subject done by Anthony Oettinger.
In 1969 Oettinger published the results of this study which he
conducted at the Harvard University Program on Technology and
Society.

It was a lucid analysis of the then current status of

educational computing entitled Run, Computer. Run.
perceptive conclusions are still applicable.

Most of his

Oettinger focused

his attention on the typical American school, ignoring both the
progressive experimental school, the rural one—room schoolhouse,
and the large urban school.

In the process he found that, although

educational computing held tremendous promise for education,
time and again in the brief history of computers, glowing experi¬
mental results have lost their meaning in the translation from
pilot scale to useful operating size."7

Instructional applications

of the computer within the typical American school were generally
a failure even though the aforementioned research efforts proved
successful.

In his text, Oettinger presents an extensive and

accurate diagnosis of the causes of the overall failure of educa¬
tional computing.

Emmanuel Mesthene synthesizes and reaffirms this

diagnosis in the "Foreword" to Oettinger's book:
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Both (the educational hardware and institutional
setting, into which it is being introduced) are
found wanting.
The hardware itself is as yet
much more primitive than is generally appreciated,
so that fragile, unreliable, and expensive devices
often gather dust in the classroom corner once the
enthusiasm that greeted their arrival has subsided.
Knowledge about how to apply the technology is even
more primitive; teaching methods and curriculum
remain virtually unmodified by the availability of
new devices.
The biggest obstacle to the rapid and
effective introduction of technology into the
schools is the structure of the American school
system itself, which, in Oettinger's words, ’seems
ideally designed to resist change.'"8

It will prove advantageous to categorize those factors contri¬
buting to the failure of educational computing into two broad
classes.

The first class would contain those factors which are

external to the educational system.

Here we have those problems

which would hinder the application of computer technology within
any institutional setting.

The second class would contain only

those factors which uniquely prevent the proper application of
computer technology within an educational setting.

1.

Prohibitive Factors External to the Educational System
There were a number of perplexing problems associated with

the unsophisticated first and second generation computing systems.
Computer hardware and communication networks were unreliable from
an engineering perspective.

Application systems and programs were

either poorly designed or restrictive in scope.

As a result,

human users were unable to effectively interact with the computer.
In particular, teachers, students, and administrators suffered the
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same inconveniences in communicating with the computer as did
users within the business and industrial community.

Oettinger

presents an excellent analysis of this situation with respect
to educational computing:

Troubles, as we shall see, arise from cost,
amount, reliability, maintenance, complexity,
comfort, standardization, integration, and
content.
In short, much longitudinal lead
time is still between us and the realization
even of glorified clerical functions.9

Financing the high initial investment of computing systems
was a major concern for any institution, educational or otherwise.
The business community required justification of expenditures in
terms of clerical savings or valuable information obtained from
the computing system.

Within education, especially in the instruc¬

tional applications of computer technology, better instruction,
not economics, seems to be the rationalization behind utilizing
the computer.

Fortunately, adequate government and foundation

funding was available to interested schools.

However, since the

publication of Oettinger's book, the economic situation has com¬
pletely reversed, and funding for education has diminished drasr
tically.

Thus, over the past five years, lack of sufficient funding

has limited research into educational computing.

2.

Prohibitive Factors Internal to the Educational System
Besides the aforementioned traditional problems associated with

computing systems, there exist problems unique to education which
prohibit educational computing.

The first is the bureaucratic
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structure of the American school system.

Oettinger describes

this problem:
Within the educational system, it is difficult
to find an appropriate audience and, still
more difficult, a boss to satisfy.
Schools
belong to everyone’s experience.
Consequently,
everyone is aware of them and has an opinion
about them...Technological change in education
is, therefore, most often coupled with the
polity within which educational policies and
procedures are developed...Whenever some external
sector of society or the schools themselves press
for change in the schools, then the schools must
in turn make their peace with all other linked
sectors of society.
Without external pressures
or alliances the schools themselves rarely
initiate change.
If change seems undesirable to
the schools but the external pressures are strong,
the schools, like any institution, tend to adopt
evasive tactics which take the form of change
without the commitment to its substance.10

Closely associated with the bureaucratic problems of the
American school system is the problem of educational objectives.
Educators simply could not adequately define their educational
goals and,

therefore, the computer technician eventually designed

systems which were unsatisfactory.

(A parallel situation exists

in business and industry wherein the manager does not know, or
is incapable of communicating, his information needs to the
systems analyst.
are produced.)
one.

As a result, costly and/or ineffective systems
The question of educational goals is an important

Oettinger gives it serious attention as a primary factor

behind unsatisfactory educational applications of the computer.
(.See Section 2.1,

"Goals Stated," and Section 2.2, "Goals Rea¬

lized," of Run, Computer, Run.)
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We shall return to the matter of educational objectives In the
following chapter.

It Is sufficient at this point to recognize

that their absence Is a significant factor prohibiting the proper
application of educational computing.

Computers and Education - 1975
Computer technology has yet to revolutionize education.
Rather, as America has continued to evolve toward a more techno¬
logical society,

the school, as a microcosm of that society, has

continued to evolve in the same direction.

Although the grandiose

projections of the 1950’s are far from realization, the computer
is slowly becoming an integral component of American education.
Within the areas of educational research and school adminis¬
tration,

the computer is no longer even novel.

For example,

graduate students pursuing advanced degrees in educational research
are expected to be at least capable of executing statistical
programs and many elect courses in computer programming.

Students

pursuing advanced degrees in educational administration are
encouraged to familiarize themselves with the basic concepts of
data processing.

The fact that proficiency in a computer programming

language such as FORTRAN, COBOL, or BASIC is now accepted as ful¬
filling the language requirement in doctoral programs by many presti¬
gious universities testifies as to the acceptance the computer has
received.
Within the instructional area the computer has made steady
progress but has yet to reach the level attained within adminis¬
tration and research.

The curriculum of many high schools now
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reflects courses in data processing and computer programming;
and many courses in various disciplines and at all levels use
some basic form of CAI in conjunction with the standard classroom
experience.11

Currently, the application of CAI is limited,

utilizing primarily the drill and practice or tutorial mode,
and is usually associated with quantifiable disciplines.

Also,

its application is predominantly in those school systems which
are located in affluent communities or those few fortunate enough
to obtain funding.

However,

it should be emphasized that such is

only the general situation today.

There are exceptions, and

CAI research and development, although not as extensive as in
the previous decade, is more realistic and provocative.

This

subject will be addressed in detail in Chapter V.

Summary and Perspectives for the Future
Two observations are significant in trying to ascertain the
future status and impact of educational computing.

The first

pertains to those factors which were external to the school system
and prohibitive with respect to educational computing.

Cost, relia¬

bility, maintenance, standardization, etc., which were identified
by Oettinger as serious problems in 1969, have received the atten¬
tion of the computer industry.

Although these problems have not

been eliminated, significant progress has been made.

The basic

indicators of this fact are the number of computers which are now
in use throughout the United States, and the continued decrease in
cost associated with the computer.12

Computer technology and

the science of systems have made major advances over the past
five years, and even a conservative futuristic projection would
indicate continued progress.

The second observation pertains to

those factors which were internal to the American school system
and inhibited educational computing.

Unlike the technological

problems which are in the process of being solved, the
tional problems remain as Oettinger described them.

educa¬

Th» A,,...,.-

cratic structure of the American school system and its lack of
well-defined goals continue to hamper educational comnuHnu.
Due to technological improvements, the cost of a small
computing system can be financed by many school systems.

And,

because a "good" school has a computer, the computer is becoming
less of a luxury and more of a necessity.

It is important to

emphasize that the evolution toward educational computing is
occurring without the sensationalism of the previous decade,
but the serious philosophical questions which were raised then
s^ill remain unanswered.

The internal educational problems of

goals and bureaucratic structure serve to slow down the imple¬
mentation of computers in schools.

(Ironically, if one sides

with the humanist in rejecting educational computing, these
problems serve to its advantage.)

However, it is only a matter

of time before the computer will make its way into the class¬
room, and, if the problem of objectives with respect to educa¬
tional computing persists,

the results could be disastrous.

Unless educators become aware of the implications of educational
computing and establish their objectives accordingly,
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the

tail wagging the dog" phenomenon could result wherein

the technology dictates the educational policy.
An examination of current educational literature reveals
that educational computing is not receiving the attention it
did during the previous decade.
style.

)

Yet the issue is even more crucial in that is is no

longer purely academic.
eliminated.
time,

(Simply, it has "gone out of

The technological obstacles are being

At the risk of crying "Wolf! Wolf!" for the second

this author recommends that educators give serious atten¬

tion to their choice of educational objectives in light of the
impact of educational computing.

More specifically, it is

crucial that educators involved with computer technology
proceed beyond debating the pros and cons of the computer and
formulate what may be called a comprehensive "philosophy of
educational computing."

Here, this means the establishment of

educational policies and practices derived from and consistent
with a predetermined philosophy of education.

The remainder of

this paper is devoted to the development of such a philosophy.
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CHAPTER I
FOOTNOTES

1. Louis Bright, Associate Commissioner for Research, U. S. Office
of Education, has stated:
’’Computers have already altered both
the techniques and concepts of school administration at elementary,
secondary, and higher levels of education."
Joseph Margolin and
Marion Misch, Eds., Computers in the Classroom (London:
MacMillan Co., Ltd.), 1970, p. x.

2. Patrick Suppes* statement is among the most grandiose of futuristic
projections.
He states:
"One can predict that in a few more years
millions of school children will have access to what Philip of
Macedon's son Alexander enjoyed as a royal prerogative:
the per¬
sonal services of a tutor as well-informed and responsive as
Aristotle."
Patrick Suppes, "The Uses of Computers in Education," Information,
(San Francisco:
W. H. Freeman and Company), 1966, p. 157.

3. Henry Chauncey, President, Educational Testing Service, reflects
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CHAPTER II

PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATIONAL COMPUTING: THE ABSENCE AND THE NECESSITY

Before proceeding to develop the proposed philosophy of educa¬
tional computing,

it will be meaningful to illustrate the absence of

such from relevant academic literature, and then justify its inclusion.
Chapter II is written with these objectives in mind.

A. Absence of a Philosophy of Educational Computing
1.

The Absence
The absence of any comprehensive philosophy of educational

computing can be observed by examining the literature on computer
use in education.

However, it will prove helpful to first take a

broader perspective and comment briefly on the literature covering
computers and society.

In general, although much has been written

on this topic, one is disappointed in searching for philosophical
foundations which provide guidelines for the application of the
computer in the social sphere.

Harold Sackman's observation is

most appropriate on this point:

All sorts of articles, books, and stories have
been written about the impact of computers and
society.
Some jaded readers may respond instinc¬
tively to the title of this chapter ('Computers,
the Scientific Spirit, and Evolving Society') as
just another Sunday supplement on the thrills,
chills, and spills of computers in the scheme of
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things to come.
of

the subject

The vast and continuing exposure
in the mass media of communication,

although often jarring and tiresome, nevertheless
reflects a growing and deep concern,
all social levels,

at virtually

over the implications of

computers and for our own and for future societies.
There is no coherent philosophy in this literature
that proposes

the systematic application of compu¬

ters toward the extension of experimental method
in social affairs.^

Sackman's

thrills,

chills,

and spills" is an accurate characteriza¬

tion of most literature on computers and society.

However,

important

exceptions to his statement exist in the writings of Jacques Ellul,
Victor Ferkiss,

Emanuel Mesthene, Marshall McLuhan, Lewis Mumford,

Norbert Wiener,

and Sackman himself.

These individuals have gone

beyond descriptive statements and engaged in thought-provoking analysis
of the nature and impact of technology.
man,

Of

these,

only Ferkiss,

Sack-

and Wiener have progressed beyond analysis and proposed global

philosophical structures to guide future technological development.
Ferkiss describes three basic elements of a new philosophy to guide
the creation of

technological man:

new immanentism.^

new naturalism,

new holism,

and

Sackman proposes a philosophy of scientific system

development based upon two broad cornerstones:

the methodology of

3
Dewey's experimentalism and humanistic automation.
lishes cybernetics as

And, Wiener estab¬

the only perspective for dealing with social

problems.^
Returning to the more restrictive area of computers and education,
we note that,

although some of

the aforementioned scholars have made

reference to education, none have specifically developed a philosophy
of educational computing.

A significant portion of the literature
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falls into the pragmatic "how to" category which describes computer
hardware,

educational software,

and associated pedagogy.

There is

also a large body of literature which describes the advantages and
I

disadvantages of educational computing,
the "thrills,

chills,

some of which falls into

and spills" category.

The shortcomings of

this literature lie in evaluation.

conclusions,

pro and con,

assimilated,

but inarticulated,

The authors’

are typically premised upon some previously
philosophy of education.

For example,

they might conclude that the computer is an effective means of teaching
modular arithmetic without formally articulating the value and purpose
of

teaching modular arithmetic in the first place.

Evaluations of

educational computing are limited in that it is the effectiveness of
the system in achieving some predetermined goal that is measured.
Very little is said about re-evaluating the desirability of the goal
itself.

Nowhere in the literature on computers and education do we

find an educator who has explicitly developed a comprehensive
philosophy of educational computing derived from and consistent with
a consciously articulated philosophy of education.
steps

Taking the first

toward one such philosophy is the primary objective of this

paper.

2.

The Reasons for the Absence
Two

factors are responsible for this absence of a philosophy of

educational computing.

The first factor is the relatively short

history of automatic computing.
just

thirty years old.

The high-speed digital computer is

This is too short a time period for the full

impact of computing to be recognized and incorporated within a philo¬
sophy of education.

The second factor is that there is no parent
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philosophy of education recognizable within the American school
system.

This is the primary reason for the absence of a philosophy of

educational computing.

Grosseman and Howe note the significance of

a parent philosophy of education:
A sound philosophy of education must precede
a philosophy of automated systems.

Without

an educational philosophy and the concomitant
goals,

any attempt at automation would result

in merely mechanizing existing operations with
the result of doing needless things faster.-*
The vast majority
of education.

of American educators have no such philosophy

This point is a central theme of Charles Silberman's

Crisis in the Classroom.

Silberman criticizes prominent educators for

their lack of philosophical perspective:
The fashion in contemporary writing about education
holds
Dr.

that talk about purpose is a frightful bore.

James Conant, probably the most prestigious and

influential contemporary student of education, has
confessed that a

'sense of distasteful weariness'

overtakes him whenever he hears someone discussing
educational goals and philosophy.
he writes,

'In such a mood,'

'I am ready to define education as what

goes on in schools and colleges'

—a definition

that has prevented him from asking whether or not
what now goes on should go on.

Martin Mayer,

influential educational journalist,
dainful of

talk about goals.

an

is equally dis¬

’It is well to rid

oneself of this business of the aims of education,'
he states flatly in his book The Schools.

'Discus¬

sions on this subject are among the dullest and
most fruitless of human pursuits.'6
Furthermore,

Silberman attaches the label of "mindlessness" to

the attitude reflected by Conant and Mayer,

the central problem of American education:

and concludes that it is
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What is mostly wrong with the public schools
is not due to venality or indifference or
stupidity, but to mindlessness...Teachers,
principals,

and superintendents are decent,

intelligent,

and caring people who try to do

their best by their lights.
botch of it,
number do,

If they make a

and an uncomfortable large

It is because it simply never

occurs to more than a handful to ask why
they are doing what they are doing—to think
seriously or deeply about the purposes or
consequences of education.7

Silberman's challenge to mindlessness requires each individual
educator to become acutely aware of his philosophy of education.
Every individual has some set of values,
strongly influences his behavior.

However, very often this set of

values is unknown to the individual.
applies

a "philosophy," which

to the majority of educators.

This condition,

unfortunately,

The result is mindlessness.

It can be rectified only if a significant number of individual educa¬
tors begin to "think seriously and deeply about the purposes and
consequences of education."

They must become conscious of their

"philosophy" and begin the process of formulating a real philosophy
of education to serve as a guide in developing educational policy
and practices.
The formulation of a philosophy of education is a difficult and
very often frustrating task which is never really completed.
topic will be addressed further in Chapter III.)
point,
more

However,

(This

at this

it should be emphasized that a philosophy of education is

than a list of educational objectives.

comment on this point is most accurate:

Geoffrey Squires'

Lists of broad educational objectives,

such as

those developed by the Educational Testing
Service for the State of Pennsylvania appear
to have very little logical or epistemological
coherence - rather they seem to be an accretion
of various discrete aims and objectives.

There

is no integrated picture of man behind them;
instead,

a multiplicity of roles and skills which

may be balanced but have no sense of interior
unity.

A second problem with such lists of educational objectives is
that

they are simply ignored and therefore have little or no rela¬

tionship to reality.

Oettinger refers to this situation in his

analysis of educational computing:

It is,

however, worthwhile asking what relation

stated goals have to reality.
close,

If the two are

then statements have not only their

undeniable political value, but they may also
be taken at face value in guiding systems analysis.
If,

however,

reality is at variance with the words,

one may expect to find in education the confusion
and discomfort attending the simultaneous keeping
of two

sets of intellectual books.

As we shall see,

there is a sharp break between rhetoric and reality,
with interesting political and technological reper¬
cussions . ^

If

the disparity between educational objectives and reality is

to be avoided,

educators must consciously establish a coherent

philosophy of education to serve as a framework within which to
develop a philosophy of educational computing.
in the next section,

As we shall see

the evolution of educational technology has

made the need for such a philosophy all the more imperative.
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B.

Need for a Philosophy of Educational Computing
The need for a philosophy of educational computing becomes appar¬
ent when one considers the powerful effects computers can have on
educational systems.

Of course,

it is foolish to undertake even the

most mundane and insignificant task without some particular objec¬
tive in mind.
approach,

Most "modern" educators,

as disciples of the systems

are very cognizant of this point.

However,

their emphasis

is often directed toward the implementation of the systems approach
in behavioristic terms, with minimal attention given to philosophical
justification of the system’s objectives.
This applies especially to educators involved with educational
computing.

If educational computing were a mundane venture with

trivial impact upon the educational process,
need for such philosophical justification.

there would be little
But,

this is not the case.

An examination of the literature on computer technology predicts
a profound impact by the computer in the near future.
If we agree with Victor Ferkiss in his comprehensive analysis of
the impact of technology,

the technological revolution is nothing

less than an "existential revolution."

Ferkiss elaborates on his

interpretation of this expression:
Humanity today is on the threshold of self¬
transfiguration,

of attaining new powers over

itself and its environment that can alter its
nature as fundamentally as walking upright or
use of tools.

No aspect of man's existence

can escape being revolutionized by this funda¬
mental fact - all his self-consciousness that
we call culture, his patterns of interaction
that we call society,
structure itself.

his very biological
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The computer is one very significant component of this techno¬
logical/existential revolution.

Its potential impact with respect

to education will be examined in detail in Chapter IV.

At this

point it is only necessary to acknowledge the power it affords those
who control the computer.

It is the magnitude of this power as

applicable to education which creates the need for a philosophy of
educational computing.

Before elaborating on this statement,

it will

be useful to examine an analogous situation—in medical technology—
which is more pressing and probably more familiar to the reader due
to its coverage by the popular media.
The relationship between power and the need for philosophical
guidelines is dramatically exemplified within the area of medical
technology.

Prior to the development of modern medical technology,

the Hippocratic oath provided an adequate set of ethical guidelines
for the physician to follow.

The physician was required to do everyr-

thing within his power to preserve the life of his patient.
Because the physician had such little power relative to the forces of
nature,

the ethic of the Hippocratic oath was quite workable and

farely presented him with a moral dilemma.

This is no longer the case.

Medical technology has virtually created a biological revolution.
The physician is now able to preserve life under circumstances which
heretofore would have been impossible.

This situation raises new

questions concerning the quality of life and the very definition of
life itself.

Research into the area of genetics and the birth of the

science of eugenics

indicate that the future will only present more

difficult questions

to be answered.
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It is important to note that these questions have always been
given consideration by both physicians and philosophers.
it was always within the realm of the hypothetical.
practice of medicine,

it was

the simple,

In the actual

but effective, Hippocratic

oath which the ethical physician followed.

New medical technology

has given tremendous new powers to the physician.
a reconsideration of

However,

the Hippocratic oath as well.

situations where a simplistic interpretation of

It has forced
There are many

this ethical code is

no longer satisfactory for physicians who sincerely have the best
interest of their patients at heart.

The power given the physician

now forces him to make existential decisions.

For example, he is now

occasionally called upon to decide if a human life is worth main¬
taining by extraordinary artificial means.

Therefore,

either the

community of physicians must collectively develop a more workable
ethic,

or the individual physician must determine his own.

In either case,

the presence of a new power increases the need for

philosophical guidelines.
The evolution of a parallel situation is just beginning in
education.

The advent of behavioral control technologies will

afford those in control of education the power to achieve their
educational objectives.

Given this power,

the need for a philosophy

of education becomes all the more imperative.
The digital computer will be a significant component of any
comprehensive behavioral control system.

of behavioral control,

comments:

As London,

in his study
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While all these new developments
affecting individuals are proceeding,
computer technology...discovers better
and better data-processing methods,
making it easier all the time to track
and predict virtually any kind of mass
behavior trend; this makes it easier,
in turn, to forecast, then control,
individuals who make up the mass.11

Besides its data processing capacities there are many other
ways in which the computer can influence the behavior of students.
These will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV.

Here it is only

necessary to emphasize the existential power inherent in the computer.
We do so by referring to Norbert Wiener,
of cybernetics.

In God & Golem,

a giant figure in the area

Inc., Wiener goes to great lengths

to dramatize the power inherent within the computer and, more impor¬
tantly,

the tremendous danger in exercising this power.

three simple legends,

"Thousand Nights and a Night,"

He cites

"The Sorcerer's

Apprentice," and "The Monkey's Paw," to illustrate his point.
Quoting directly from Wiener:

The theme of all these tales is the danger
of magic.

This seems to lie in the fact

that the operation of magic is singularly
literal-minded,
anything at all,
ask for,

and that if it grants you
it grants you what you

not what you should have asked for

or what you intend.12

Wiener continues:
The magic of automation...may be expected
to be similarly literal-minded.

If you are

playing a game according to certain rules
and set the playing-machine to play for
victory if you get anything at all, and
the machine will not pay the slightest atten¬
tion to any consideration except victory accor
ding to the rules.13
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Returning to educational computing, we must recognize that
the computer will bestow upon the educator powers of unprecedented
magnitude.

The availability of such power demands a philosophy of

educational computing to guide the educator in determining the
appropriate circumstances for its application.

This philosophy

must be based upon a philosophy of education which gives serious
attention to educational objectives.
computer technology,

For, with the application of

there will be greater chance that these objec¬

tives will be realized.

The future will see the educator confronting

the same crisis of choice with which the modern physician is just
beginning to grapple.

Only at a superficial level is there a distinc¬

tion in their positions.

Both must come to some conclusions, however

tentative, regarding the basic questions of philosophy.

Yet, unlike

their predecessors, they will be forced to make decisions based upon
their philosophy.

Technology will have removed their choice of

philosophy from the realm of the hypothetical.
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CHAPTER III
EXISTENTIALISM AND EDUCATION

A. Existentialism
Existentialism is not a systematic philosophy in the conventional
sense.

Rather, it is a label representing the philosophic position of

a number of individuals who have reacted against the traditional
philosophical systems of Western civilization.

Or, as Kaufmann has

said of existentialism:

The refusal to belong to any school of thought,
the repudiation of the adequacy of any body of
beliefs whatever, and especially of systems,
and a marked dissatisfaction with traditional
philosophy as superficial, academic, and remote
from life - that is the heart of existentialism.^

The existential movement has expressed itself in literature, drama,
philosophy, psychology, and theology.

In these areas the following

individuals have become prominent as representatives of the existential
position:

Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, Sartre, Heidegger,

Jaspers, Camus, Kafka, Beckett, Tillich, Buber, Marcel, and Frankl.
There are, of course, significant differences in the positions held by
these individuals.

In fact, a number have specifically rejected the

existential label because of strong disagreement with Sartre, one of
the few who acknowledges the term.

However, commentators on the exis-
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tential movement feel justified in classifying these writers together
because of their collective rejection of traditional systematic
philosophy and their willingness to address common themes.

These

themes surround the subtective dimension of man, a subject which is
either rejected or ignored by modern scientific philosophies.
Strain emphasizes this point:
Existential thinking focuses on the notion of
paradox, despair, anxiety, absurdity, faith,
hope, and love to indicate a man’s personal
relationships to the world, to others, and to
himself.2
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide the reader with
a comprehensive perspective of Existentialism.

Such a perspective,

though not vital to understanding the remainder of this paper, is recom¬
mended and thus the interested reader is encouraged to consult the
bibliography for further information.

What immediately follows is only

the skeleton of existential thought as specified by Jean-Paul Sartre
in his Existentialism and Humanism.

Most Existentialists would probably

accept the following statements as valid but might soon disagree if
they engaged in a serious discussion on their interpretation.

Sartre

is quoted to illustrate the following four concepts which are consi¬
dered to be intrinsic to Existentialism:
1. Existentialism is first and foremost a philosophy of man
as a subjective being.
Man is nothing else but that which he makes
of himself.
That is the first principle of
Existentialism.
And this is what people call
its 'subjectivity,' using the word as a reproach
against us.

But what do we mean to say by
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this, but that man is of a greater dignity than
a stone or a table?
For we mean to say that man
primarily exists - that man is, before all else,
something which propels itself toward a future
and is aware that it is doing so.
Man is, indeed,
a project which possesses a subjective life,
instead of being a kind of moss, or a fungus,
or a cauliflower.3

2.

Man is free to choose; in fact, man must choose.
Subjectivity means, on the one hand, the freedom of
the individual subject and, on the other, that man
cannot pass beyond human subjectivity,
It is the
latter which is the deeper meaning of existentialism.
When we say that man chooses himself, we do mean that
every one of us must choose himself.^

3.

Man is responsible for his choices.
Thus, the first effect of existentialism is that it puts
every man in possession of himself as he is, and places
the entire responsibility for his existence squarely
upon his own shoulders.^

4.

Choosing and being responsible for his choices involves
anguish.
The existentialist frankly states that man is in anguish.
His meaning is as follows:
When a man commits himself
to anything, fully realizing that he is not only choosing
what he will be, but is thereby at the same time a legis¬
lator deciding for the whole of mankind - in such a moment
man cannot escape from the sense of complete and profound
responsibility.°

The concepts of subjectivity, free choice, responsibility, and
anguish are central to existential thought.

The approach to these

concepts varies among individual existentialists and very often, as we
shall see, leads to other related concepts involving the existential
state of man.

In order to pursue this discussion of existentialism
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further, it will be most helpful to borrow a structure recommended by
Van Clev Morris in his text entitled Philosophy and the American
School.^

Here he advocates describing a philosophy in terms of its

ontology, epistemology, and axiology.

We shall do so, and also make

extensive use of his insights bearing on the relationship of existen¬
tialism to education.

B. The Ontology of Existentialism
According to Morris the goal of ontology is to answer the question:
"What is real?"

Among the existentialists, Martin Heidegger has given

this question the greatest attention.

8

However, since Heidegger s

writing is probably the most complex of all the existentialists, we
turn again to Sartre for a clearer explanation of existential ontology.
He attempts to define the common element within all existential thought

What they have in common is simply the fact that
they believe that existence comes before essence or, if you will, that we must begin from the subjec¬
tive. 9

From this simple ontological statement, "existence comes before
essence," Sartre proceeds to derive his aforementioned conclusions
concerning choice, responsibility, and anguish as they necessarily
relate to man.

Sartre's position is accurately described by Morris:

We can, say the Existentialists, develop all kinds
of interesting theories concerning essence and
existence in the universe at large.
But when we
come to Man we are stumped.
Traditional philoso¬
phies have always assumed the priority in time of
the essence of man over his existence...
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Existentialism begins by turning this
priority upsidedown: In Man, existence
precedes essence.
We first are; then we
attempt to define ourselves... as we per¬
form this and that activity, make this and
that choice, prefer this, reject that, we
are actually in the process of defining
ourselves, of providing the essence for
which we search.10
According to the Existentialist, man cannot find an answer to the
disturbing question:

"Who am I?"

by an ontological investigation.

There is no answer to be discovered
Each individual human being must

create his own answer; he does so by the choices he makes.

And, be¬

cause there is no external agency to guide him in this project, he
alone is responsible for the results of his choices.

Herein lies

the source of anguish which must accompany human choice.

C.

The Epistemology of Existentialism
Epistemology,

in the formal sense of the term (the study of the

origin, nature, methods, and limits of knowledge), has not received
much attention from existential philosophers.

This situation is con¬

sistent with their ontological position and not due to any lack of in¬
sight or motivation to investigate the subject.

Morris explains:

Now when we use the word choice it is to be under¬
stood in its largest and fullest meaning.
Making
a choice is not confined to deciding to do some¬
thing. It also includes deciding to believe some¬
thing, to accept something as true. Hence we are
confronted at the outset with the epistemological
significance of the Existentialist ontology, namely,
the existential freedom of man in choosing his own
truth. Each man is his own supreme court of episte¬
mological judgment, and he is, therefore, in an ul¬
timate sense, absolutely on his own when it comes
to deciding between candidates for truth.
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All this suggests that the Existentialist
has little to offer in a way of a method of
knowing, a systematic epistemology. Rather,
he is concerned with pointing out that in
all knowing—sense perception, logical demon¬
stration, scientific proof, intuition, revela¬
tion—it is the individual self which must
make the ultimate decision as to what is, as
a matter of fact, true. 11While attesting

to the validity of the various methods by which

man comes to know both himself and the universe,

the existentialist

strongly rejects any philosophical position which claims man can
acquire an understanding of himself by purely objective methods of
investigation.

More specifically, the existentialist is at odds with

those philosophers who claim that the scientific method is the best or
the only way man can come to know himself.

In acknowledging and giving

priority to the subjective dimension of man, the existentialist asserts
that man can and does come to know himself in a sense that cannot be
incorporated within the scientific method.
a duality in modes of knowledge.

This condition establishes

Morris simply calls these "Mode One"

and "Mode Two," defining them as follows:
To put this plan in plain language, we can say
that in Mode One I am conscious of an existential
world (somewhat in the manner of the Realist;...),
and that in Mode Two I am also conscious of my
consciousness of this world.
I somehow know my
own existentiality.^
Morris identifies science as a Mode One type of knowing.
for all its successes,

However,

the existentialist places a higher priority on

the Mode Two form of knowing, even though this may be called a
retreat into mysticism or poetry:
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Nevertheless, the Existentialist insists on the
validity, indeed the primacy, of 'Mode Two' knowing.
Each one of us recognizes this knowing within him¬
self.
Although we cannot report on it concerning
other people, we certainly cannot deny its existen¬
tial presence within our own being.
If this be
poetry, let it stand.
For there is a kind of knowing
in poetry, after all.
Poetry is not sterile of
epistemological content.13

Thus we see that the epistemology of the existentialist is an openended affair, the only definite assertion being the admission of some
form of a subjective

D.

(Mode Two) path to knowledge.

The Axiology of Existentialism
Axiology, the study of ethics and aesthetics, is, for the existen¬

tialist, dictated by his ontological position.

Ultimately, it is the

individual who must determine what is good and beautiful.

This may

involve an unpopular individual act of conscience of a revolt from the
public norm in the creation or appreciation of a work of art.

The indi¬

vidual may elect to be guided by some code of ethics or aesthetic
standard.

However, he must first freely choose the particular code or

standard, and,

in so doing, is responsible for this choice.

The absence of any pre-existing set of guidelines to aid in ethical
or aesthetic decision-making implies that existential axiology, at its
most fundamental level, is value free.
or aesthetic indifference.
the exact opposite is true.

This is not to profess amorality

In fact, especially in the realm of ethics,
Morris emphasizes this point in his discus¬

sion of comparative axiologies:

If Experimentalism has given over a lion's share of
its time to value theory, we may safely say that
Existentialism is almost obsessed with it.
For ExiS”
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tentialism is principally a value theory,
a philosophy according to which everything
must pass through a funnel of choice.
And since choice if fundamentally an exercise
in valuing, the entirety of philosophical
content in Existentialism may be described as
axiological.^

Recognizing the existential given fact of necessary human choice
without any pre-existing standards of value, the existentialist professes
that it is by exercise of this choice that axiological values are deter¬
mined.

Quoting again from Morris:

Let us, says the Existentialist, go the whole way
in ethical theory and simply say what we must say,
namely that our values consist of our own choices.
In choosing we make our values out of nothing.
No God, no pope, no society can tell me what I must
value.

It is the recognition of this reality which leads to the existential
notion of anguish.

Individual existentialists, confronting the anguish

of choice, have taken varying positions on ethical situations and
problems.
failure.

Any attempt to generalize their conclusions is doomed to
However, it would be safe to say that, because the focal

point of existential philosophy is man, the literature of existentialism
has a strong flavor of humanism.

Sartre, in response to critics who

claim existentialism is unjustifiably obsessed with the dark side of
human existence, has specifically described existentialism as a kind of
humanism:

Many people are going to be surprised at what is
said here about humanism.
We shall try to see in
what sense it is to be understood.
In any case,
what can be said from the very beginning is that
by existentialism we mean a doctrine which makes
human life possible and, in addition, declares that
every truth and action implies a human setting and
a human subjectivity.16
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E.

Science and Technology: The Existential Perspective
In general, existential writers tend to emphasize the negative
dimension of science and technology:

In terms of its content, modern existential thinking
focuses on the human person in a technological and
scientific age.
Many existentialists are pessimistic
about modern life and indicate that utopianism based
on science is an illusion.
They believe science and
technology have brought human beings loneliness and
alienation rather than peace and progress.
The insti¬
tutional organization of science, by and for the state,
has dehumanized man.17

For sure,
age.

the existentialist is aware of the absurdity of the modern

Thanks to the ingenuity of the technocrat, heads of state now

engage in "rational" discussion about over-kill weapons systems.
Realizing that there exists no force inherent in the nature of the
universe which necessarily dictates the continued existence of man,
and yet being deeply committed to the preservation of this fragile
being,

the existentialist experiences greater anxiety in the insane

presence of over-kill weapons systems than one who harbors the human¬
ist's vision of an anthropocentric universe.
This negative perspective of science and technology is justifiable.
However, an outright rejection of science and technology is not the
only legitimate position an existentialist may take.
warrants further investigation.

This subject

The final chapter will do so within

the context of educational computing.
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Existentialism and Education
Partly due to the fact that existentialism is a very recent
philosophy, not much has been said explicitly on the subject of
education by the major existential writers.

Among the leading

existentialists only Martin Buber has given more than a passing
reference to education.

However, secondary commentators on exis¬

tentialism and philosophers of education have examined the educa¬
tional implications of existentialism.

What follows is a brief

description of the various dimensions of education upon which some
consensus of opinion among existential educators exists.

1.

The Aims of Education
Philosophers of education are most consistent regarding the objec¬

tives of an existential education.

The goals of education are basically

the goals of existential philosophy itself.

Mitchell Bedford, in his

text, Existentialism and Creativity, enumerates twenty-two such goals
according to four leading existential philosophers: Soren Kierkegaard,
Martin Buber, Karl Jaspers, and Jean-Paul Sartre.

Eleven of these

goals, common to all four writers, are listed below:

1) The starting point for self-knowledge is in
subjectivity.
Man can never divorce himself
from the subjective.
2) Man must undertake a search for stability,
he must not take things for granted, his
behavior must be purposive; he must be
purposive, he must will himself to be, he is
sustained becoming.
3) Man must seek to know himself.
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4) Man can alter his situation, elaborate himself;
man has free choice, he is not in a final situa¬
tion, he is free to create.
5) The authority of man’s action must be based on his
own choice.
There are no compelling external
situations.
6) Man must accept his limitations, his fastidiousness,
his ultimate situations.
7) Man must accept the fact that life contains tragedy,
that he must be anxious, that he is problematic to
himself.
8) Man is conscious that he exists.
He can reflect or is reflection - on his existence.
He can transcend
his physical limitations.
He becomes what he is not.
9) Man is dependent upon the judgment of others for
maximum self-knowledge.
Others help to shape his being.
10) Man should learn to exist within his community; he needs
love; he should avoid a crowd.
11) Man must not force his convictions on other people,
although he will aid them to want to know themselves.^

The aforementioned educational objectives are various aspects of
the main existential goal, which according to Bedford is "Man must come
to know himself."^

Thus we see that the educational objectives are

similar to those of the human potential movement with their desire to
educate the whole man.

The significant difference in these two

approaches to education is that existentialism emphasizes the individual
in a radical manner in comparison with humanism.

It is also worth

reiterating at this point Sartre's exposition of existentialism as
a kind of humanism.

Therefore, although the humanist and existentialist

may differ regarding the ontological status of man and the cosmos, their
educational objectives are almost identical.
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2. The Curriculum
Given the strong humanistic flavor of the existential educational
objectives, most existential philosophers of education recommend that
the "humanities” dominate the curriculum.

This position is articu¬

lated by Morris:
The Existentialist school would probably start
from the 'humanities’ end of the curriculum to
develop its program. That is, it would tend to
emphasize those subject matters in which private
choice and decision have greater prominence,
namely, the arts, philosophy, literature, creative
writing, the drama, etc. This follows from the
view that the subjective growth of the individual
is the most important kind of growth.20
This is not the only position held by existentialists about the curri¬
culum.

If one acknowledges freedom and responsibility within the

student, as the existentialist does, it would be inconsistent to
demand that the student be limited to a curriculum with any permanent
bias whatever.

Dupuis and Nordberg express this opinion as being

held by other prominent existentialists:
It is worth noting, however, that Nietzsche, Kneller,
and Ralph Harper do not demand that history, science,
mathematics, and the like be thrown out of the curri¬
culum. Their criticism is leveled at the impersonal,
cold, and dry-as-dust approach to subject matter
found in schools.21
They continue:
The existentialist is not so much concerned with
the actual courses or subjects in the curriculum
as he is with what the teacher and (most especially)
the student does with them.
The exercise of exis¬
tential freedom within the curriculum is more
important than the curriculum content.
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It is this second position on the curriculum which will be
advocated in the next chapter where educational computing will be
incorporated within the existentialist's philosophy of education.

3•

Student - Teacher Interaction
Both the student and the teacher are to be recognized as individual

human beings engaged in the serious enterprise of education.

Their

relationship should be one of sincere human communication and not
restricted by unnecessary formal structures.

Harper specifies the

nature of this relationship:

But whenever there are these three elements,
the teacher, the pupil, the curriculum, there
is the possibility of education.
Whenever
two are together with a third thing, which
takes both out of themselves, there is educa¬
tion.
And the only difference between pupil
and teacher is that the teacher leads, while
the pupil is moved.
But he who is moved now
may in the next sentence, even in his moving,
lead his teacher, who then becomes the pupil.23

This implies that education is a natural process which is in no way
contingent upon the formal notion of "schooling."

Yet, planned educa¬

tion must take place somewhere, and it is the teacher who is respon¬
sible for establishing the educational environment.

Buber elaborates

on this point:

The world—that is, the whole environment, nature
and society—'educates' the human being:
it draws
out his powers, and makes him grasp and penetrate
its objections.
What we term education, conscious
and willed, means a selection by man of the effec¬
tive world; it means to give decisive effective power
to a selection of the world which is concentrated and
manifested in the educator.
The relation in education
is lifted out of the purposelessly streaming education
by all things, and is marked off as purpose.3
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This "selection of the effective world" for the student is
a delicate matter.

The educator must establish conditions and

carry out a dialogue with the student which will engender the exis¬
tential growth of the student, yet avoid imposing his own convic¬
tions upon the student.

Again we refer to Harper:

The good teacher aims to produce, not replicas,
but men and women who stand apart from him even
more distinctly than when he first met them.
The good teacher does not want imitators but,
rather, men and women who through their education
have experienced the shock of discovering the
infinite depths of the world and truth without
giving up any of the partial truths they have
encountered along the way...
A teacher knows he
has succeeded only when he has evidence that his
pupils can hold something to be true that he him¬
self is convinced is true, without having come to
this truth by imitating the teacher, by reasoning,
or by any other powers of persuasion, including
the persuasion of example.25

As with the curriculum, there is no single specific methodology
which the existential educator employs to achieve his objectives.
In part this is premised on the fact that each student is to be conn
fronted as the unique individual who he is.

The teaching techniques

should be dictated according to the particular needs and desires of
the individual student.

However, even though there is no absolute

methodology associated with an existential education, existential
philosophers have made several recommendations which are worthy of
consideration.
Bedford echoes the methodology of the experimentalist in noting that
"learning is accomplished by doing, action, and applying the lesson
material."
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Morris, being consistent with the existential epistemology,

agrees with Bedford while dramatizing the subjective dimension of
the student's experience:

First of all, whatever method of teaching is
selected and emphasized, it must be one which
recognizes that the learner learns from the
inside out, so to speak.
This means, among
other things, that the learner in school must
be encouraged to identify with his subject
matter, to identify with it emotionally so
that he can announce a personal reaction to it.

Therefore, in every subject matter (if we retain
the subject curriculum) a real effort must be made
to involve the learner directly.
He must get
personally tangled up in the subject matter.27

Kneller sees student participation in simulations as a legitimate
technique toward stimulation of personal reactions.

He describes

his approach in teaching ancient history to seventh-graders:

I stress the men themselves who were responsible
for these events.
I consider them as actors
playing out their respective roles in the great
encounters of politics.
I divide the different
parts among my class'—Julius Caesar, Pompey the
Great, Brutus, Mark Anthony, Cicero, Octavianus.
To relive the past, we must cease to be its
OO
spectators and become instead its agents.^0

Kneller also recommends the revival of the Socratic method as
a technique to encourage a personal response on the part of the student.
However,

Buber is the existentialist who has the most to say regarding

the dialogue between the student and teacher.

His concept of an

I - Thou dialogue (vs. an I - It conversation) goes beyond the Socratic
method in encouraging a deep, sincere, subjective communication between
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the student and teacher.

This is more than a methodology for Buber;

it is the essence of his philosophy.29

The aforementioned educational techniques appear to be amenable
to an existential education although existential educators have had
little to say regarding the particulars, e^. , student’s age, level
of intellectual and emotional development, culture, sex, etc., in
their application.

To a certain degree this may be intentional.

The existentialist is reluctant to specify educational algorithms,
for it is the teacher’s responsibility to come to know his student
subjectively, as an individual, and to make decisions accordingly.
Perhaps the only maxim which can be offered to the teacher is that
he must set an example himself.

He must be actively and consciously

involved in his own existential growth.

Without this prerequisite,

any methodology is doomed to failure.

G.

Educational Computing
The issue of educational computing has not been investigated within
the context of an existential philosophy of education.

However, given

their general distrust of science and technology and radical emphasis
on the subjective dimension of man, it is reasonable to conclude that
existential educators would be inclined to reject, rather than accept,
the computer into the schoolhouse.
further examination.

Yet, this tenuous conclusion merits

The issue of educational computing is too complex

to permit a simplistic good/bad judgment.

(This is not to deny

the legitimacy of the existential educator rejecting the computer
after serious consideration.)

Likewise, the often-heard opinion,
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"the computer is a tool;

it’s neutral; it depends on how it is

used," is overly simplistic.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to a clarification of
the issue of educational computing as it pertains to an existential
philosophy of education.

47
CHAPTER III
FOOTNOTES

.

1

.

Walter Kaufmann, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre.
(New York:
The World Publishing Company), 1970, p. 12,

2

John Strain (ed,), Modern Philosophies of Education.
(New York:
Random House), 1971, p, 283.

3.

Jean-Paul Sartre referenced by Morton White in The Age of Analysis.
(New York:
Mentor Books), 1955, p. 124,
(Quoted from original
source Existentialism and Humanism by Sartre.)

4.

Ibid. , p.

5.

Ibid., pp.

.

125.
124-125.

6

Ibid., p.

7.

Van Clev Morris, Philosophy and the American School,
Houghton Mifflin), 1961.

.

126.
(Boston:

8

See Heidegger’s Sein and Zeit, translated by John Macquarrie and
Edward Robinson as Being and Time (London; SCM Press, and New York:
Harper and Row, 1962).

9.

Sartre in White...p.

122.

Van Clev Morris...p.

74.

.
11.
12.

10

Ibid. , pp.

166-167.

Ibid., p.

168.

13.

Ibid., p.

172.

14.

Ibid., p.

224.

15.

Ibid. , p.

277.

16.

Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions,
Philosophical Library, Inc.),

17.

John Strain...p. 285.

1957, p.

10.

(New York:

48
18.

Mitchel Bedford, Existentialism and Creativity,
Philosophical Library, Inc.), 1972, pp. 256-7,

19.

Ibid.,

20.

Van Clev Morris...p.

21.

Adrian Dupuis and Robert Nordberg, Philosophy and Education,
(Milwaukee:
Bruce Publishing Co.), 1968, p. 255.

22.

Ibid., p.

23.

Ralph Harper, "Significance of Existentialism and Recognition for
Education" in Modern Philosophies of Education by Nelson Henry
(Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press), 1955, pp. 229-230.

24.

Martin Buber, Between Man and Man,
p.

p.

(New York:

256.
392.

256.

(New York:

The Macmillan Co,),

89.

25.

Ralph Harper...p.

26.

Mitchel Bedford...p.

303.

27.

Van Clev Morris...p.

392.

28.

George Kneller, "Education, Knowledge, and the Problem of Existence,"
in Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society
1961, p.

29.

237.

137.

Martin Buber, Between Man and Man and I and Thou, translated by
Walter Kaufman, (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons), p. 24.

49

CHAPTER IV
TOWARD AN EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATIONAL COMPUTING

A.

Why Existentialism?
The first and most reasonable question the reader may ask
is "Why an 'existential* philosophy of educational computing?"
The answer to this question is threefold:

(1) Existential thinking

focuses on problems unique to the twentieth century—in this case,
the computer;

(2) Misapplication of educational computing threatens

existential/humanistic values; and (3) The author professes
a personal predisposition in favor of the existential creed.
Let us examine each reason in more detail.
The first reason for favoring existentialism stems from this
paper's concern with the digital computer, an invention of the
twentieth century, and perhaps the most powerful and versatile tool
yet developed by man.

The computer, while it has solved many of

man's problems, has also presented man with new problems which he
has not encountered historically.

(For example, a citizen's right

to privacy is now threatened by computerized data banks.)
Existentialism is a philosophy of the twentieth century and addresses
itself to problems which are developing during this period.
Quoting from Harper:
A man born in the twentieth century has problems
which were not problems for a man living one hundred
or seven hundred years ago.
And existentialism
directs one's attention to this fact.
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This position is also articulated by Bedford who claims that
the twentieth century has had a "catastrophic effect on the
development of human personality."

In offering evidence for this

opinion, he describes three conditions which, as illustrated below,
can be associated with misuse of the computer:

1) There is a great leveling process underway,
and there is a tendency to think only in
abstractions or generalities.
2) The age is one of mechanization, objectifica¬
tion of man and organizations - Man is a cog
in the wheels.
3) The individual is no longer held responsible
for what he becomes.
He is enmeshed in a
2
feeling of helplessness.

It is the potential dangers associated with educational compu¬
ting that gives rise to the second reason for advocating an exis¬
tential philosophy of educational computing.

In the following

section it will be demonstrated that the many differing criticisms
so often leveled at educational computing have a common thread;
namely, each problem can be perceived as a threat to some important
existential value.

(This situation could conceivably justify out¬

right rejection of educational computing by existential educators.
This author is not sympathetic toward such a negative response.
However, this is not to deny its validity.)

This author contends

that an educational environment permeated with an existential atmos¬
phere is a safeguard against the dangers inherent in educational
computing.

The philosophical rationale behind this conclusion will

be examined thoroughly in Section C.
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The last and most important reason for advocating an exis¬
tential philosophy of educational computing is a personal one.
Simply, this author chooses to echo the attitude of Bugental who,
in defending existentialism as the philosophic foundation of his
humanistic approach to psychotherapy, says:

In the simplest, most candid terms, the exis¬
tential perspective simply feels right.
As I
read what others have written about the exis¬
tential perspective, as I employ it in my own
work, there is a sense of closure and even,
at times, of elegance.^

The brief description of existential philosophy presented
in the previous chapter stands as the foundation for the philo¬
sophy of educational computing to be developed here.

It will

serve as this author’s set of "axioms" because of its appeal in
being consistent with his personal perspective of man and
the cosmos.

B.

The Negative Dimension of Educational Computing:

An Existential

Perspective
In this section the various dangers of educational computing
will be enumerated.

Most of these have already been specified by

critics of educational computing.

Our intention here is to illus¬

trate that, upon inspection, one can detect a common thread in this
criticism:

Each insensitive application of educational computing

promotes conditions which are contrary to existential objectives.
It is important to recognize that these pitfalls are not overt as
in the case of nuclear weapons or industrial pollution.

Rather,

their influences are subtle, falling primarily in the realm of

52

psychology, possibly even to be thought of as causing psychic
destruction.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to perform an

in-depth analysis of each topic examined here.

The intention here

is to simply make reference to the particular negative dimensions
of educational computing and document their relevancy to exis¬
tential philosophy.

1.

Educational Data Banks
The issue of computers, data banks, and information storage

and retrieval systems as they relate to a citizen’s right to privacy
has been the topic of much discussion for which there exists a growing
body of literature.^

Records maintained by educational institutions

would necessarily be a significant component of any truly compre¬
hensive data bank.

Most discussion of the privacy issue is political

and sociological, reflecting its close association with the estab¬
lishment and maintenance of a totalitarian society.

Obviously, such

a society, regardless of its political philosophy, would be repugnant
to the existentialist.

However, the presence of computerized data

banks can have a psychological impact other than detering rebellious
activity by fear of detection.

In this section we specifically

examine the negative influences pertinent to educational data banks.
We focus on this issue as it affects both the teacher and the
student.
a.

Negative Influences Upon Educators
The existential educator is expected to be acutely aware of

and willing to accept the responsibility for the important deci-
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sions he must make which affect the lives of his students.
The basis of his decisions should be a knowledge of his students
as individuals, not as quantifiable objects.

However, the modern

trend is toward the scientific approach to decision-making.
This has made the computer a welcome tool.

And, to the degree

that it has made possible the manipulation of data in a manner
which was heretofore impractical, it has reinforced and perpe¬
tuated the scientific cult.
Those who defend use of the computer in decision-making
emphasize that the computer only provides information for a human
agent who should always have the final word.
position is correct.

In principle, this

If the individuals who make final decisions

are sympathetic with existential values and do not become enchan¬
ted with the mystique of the computer, the information provided
them could prove to be a legitimate tool for responsible decision¬
making.

Unfortunately, man is a fragile being who may seek to

avoid the anguish of making a decision.

Our cultural values are

the Mhard-nosed" analytic approach to problem-solving.
fore,

There¬

the individual who conforms to that cultural pressure and

formulates an opinion primarily on the basis of computer output
will be subject to less criticism than one who does not, in the
event of disaster.
The authors of Technology and Values at the Harvard University
Program on Technology and Society, while making no statements
advocating existentialism as a philosophical system, do reflect
an awareness of the existential state of man and the dangers
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inherent in computer decision-making:

The frailty of man in making decisions increases
with the growing complexity of the world and the
diminution in individual identity and responsi¬
bility.
Today man can more easily escape the
freedom and responsibility of choice through the
use of the computer.
After all, who can be held
responsible for a decision by a computer? Man
looks for someone or something outside himself
that has the qualities he feels lacking in him¬
self—solidity, infallibility, and so on.5

Erich Fromm, a psychoanalyst associated with the existential move¬
ment, has made a comprehensive study of man’s tendency to avoid respon¬
sibility in his Escape From Freedom.^

He asks the following questions

and answers them affirmatively:
Can freedom become a burden, too heavy for man to bear,
something he tries to escape from? ... Is there not also,
perhaps, besides an innate desire for freedom, an instinc¬
tive wish for submission?^
Fromm proceeds to examine the mechanisms of escape.
three:

He specifies

authoritarianism, destructiveness, and automation conformity.

It is the third mechanism of escape, automation conformity, which he
says is of the greatest social significance.

Fromm describes this

particular mechanism as the solution adopted by the majority of

normal

members of modern society and defines it as follows:

To put it briefly, the individual ceases to be himself;
he adopts entirely the kind of personality offered to
him by cultural patterns; ... The person who gives up
his individual self and becomes an automation, with
millions of other automations around him, need not feel
alone and anxious anymore.
But the price he pays,
however, is high; it is the loss of his self.

Returning to educational computing, we now ask two questions:
(1) Will school administrators submit to the tendency to escape from freedom

55

and conform to the scientific cult of modern management
to the point that they lose perspective of their exis¬
tential responsibility as educators? and

(2) Will the

computer, in serving to perpetuate standardized testing,
measurement, and objective record-keeping, influence
educators to make important decisions regarding students
without "knowing" each individual student in the sense
advocated by existential philosophers of education?
Unfortunately,

this author answers "yes," tentatively,

to both questions and speculates that such is already
happening.
b. Negative Influences Upon Students
Guiding the student in his search for self-identity,
helping him in his struggle for an answer to the question
"Who Am I?" is a paramount concern of the existential
educator.

Quoting from Morris:
The educator’s task is to place at the
disposal of the young as many different
'climates’ as he can conceive of: ...From
these ’climates’ the youngster's own self¬
hood will create its own climate: It will
select out of this endless continuum of
possible human experiences what it considers
relevant to Its fulfillment as a unique
and ultimate human self.9

The student will make many errors in his choosing, for
which he is responsible and may suffer.

But no mistake is

absolute in the sense that he cannot again choose, and thus
redefine himself.

This is the essential process of self-
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definition.

The individual, because of his subjective

dimension, is open-ended; he never defines himself in
an absolute sense; rather, he is always "becoming,"
continually defining himself through his choices.
Again we refer to Morris:

There is a kind of 'infinity' to the
Existentialist conception of self
so final and absolute as to prejudice
in advance any 'definition' we might
draw up of the Perfect Man.
One of
Existentialism's central tenets is
that the Idea of Man is not yet finished.
We help make this Idea with our lives,
with our choices.I®

Now, returning to the issue of educational data banks,
it is obvious that such could permanently hinder an indivi¬
dual's efforts at re-self-definition.

Therefore, it becomes

more difficult to follow the old American tradition of
"going West to get a clean start on life."

The maintenance

of an education file on the student contributes to what
Schachtel calls a "paper-identity."

(Schachtel does not

address the automation dimension of this problem.

He speaks

of passports, driver’s licenses, etc., but the key charac¬
teristic of a paper-identity is that it is something fixed
and definite.)

Schachtel's central point is the association

of a paper-identity with alienation, a major concern of the
existentialist:
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Such paper-identity seems far removed,
at first glance, from the current concern
of psychoanalysts, philosophers, and
other students of the contemporary scene,
with man's search for and doubt in his
identity.
But actually it is quite central
to it.
It is a telling symbol of alienated
identity.
It is a kind of identity which
is the product of bureaucratic needs of
commerce and administration.^

It is one thing, and bad enough, to have a paper-identity
tagged onto an individual by a bureaucracy,

However, the

real tragedy occurs when the individual, in his "escape from
freedom," accepts and acknowledges this identity,

Schachtel,

reflecting the concern of an existentialist, describes this
tragedy:

In our own and many other societies the loss
of identity takes place without the terror
of the concentration camps, in more insidious
ways ,,, They tend to accept the paperidentity as their real identity.
It is temp¬
ting to do so because it is something fixed
and definite and does not require that the
person be really in touch with himself.

From an existential perspective the acceptance of a false
objectified identity is the most dangerous pitfall to be
associated with the continued expanded data banks by school
administrations.

It could serve to saddle the student with

a fixed, definite identity—a package of adjectives similar
to those describing the quality of meats in the butcher
shop—which, unfortunately, only a few of the strong-minded
fully reject.
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2.

Computer Assisted Instruction (CAI)
In this section the expression "Computer Assisted Instruction"

is used in the restrictive sense, implying the traditional drill
and practice and tutorial modes only.

(Other modes of CAI have

been suggested, and these will be examined later.)

At this point

our intention is to illustrate that CAI, as it has been conven¬
tionally conceptualized and implemented, is not easily compatible
with an existential education.
The first and most conspicuous conflict arises because most
traditional CAI systems are developed within the framework of
a behavioristic model.

The computer, usually via a remote

terminal, presents some information and a question (the stimulus)
to the student.

The student answers the question (the response).

The computer then examines the student’s answer relative to the
objective of the lesson, presents its evaluation (positive or
negative feedback)

to the student, and starts the cycle over

again by selecting and presenting more information and questions,
Barry et al,, comments on the restrictiveness of this approach;

.Much of the work in educational computing has been
done by people who narrowly construe "computer-aided
instruction" as an extension of programmed instruc¬
tion, and the computer as a successor to the Skin¬
nerian teaching machine.13

Many favoring the scientific approach to behavior are satis¬
fied with the traditional form of CAI.

However, the existen¬

tialist completely rejects the behavioristic model of man.
For the existentialist, man is more than a "black box" whose
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behavior can be conditioned and thus predicted by establishing
the appropriate environmental conditions.

Given the conflicting

concepts of man held by the behaviorists and the extentialists,
it is reasonable that their educational objectives would differ,
as they in fact do.

But CAI is not an educational goal; it is

a methodology by which an objective is achieved.
esting and important question presents itself.

Thus an inter¬
Is it permissible

for an educator to borrow the techniques of a philosophy of
education contrary to the one he identifies with?

Specifically,

should the existentialist utilize tools of the behaviorist?
Although there is no unequivocal answer to this question, it seems
reasonable that the existentialist would be skeptical of their
benefit.

We will return to this issue in discussing educational

methodology in the final chapter.
A second concern with respect to traditional CAI is that of
control.

Within the behavioristic model it is the computer, not

the student, that has primary control during the studentcomputer interaction.

Even the teacher has a secondary role.

Elliott,in her discussion of three representative CAI projects,
identifies this situation as a negative aspect of traditional CAI

Student and teacher control in these projects is
limited.
Students have some control over work
sequences, over auxiliary materials they will use,
and when they will start and stop.
Teachers, in
the same vein, have some authority over which
'pre-packaged' materials they will give to stu¬
dents, and in some cases, they control the amount
of time students will spend at terminals.

60

Lessons are doled out to students on
a reward-punishment basis — if
sequence is correct,
sequence;
And,

if

the

branch to the next

incorrect,

try again.

rigid roles are prescribed for

teachers using this computerized
material,14

In that the existential educator prefers the student to have
a maximum control over his educational experience, he would
agree with this criticism.

A small group of educators, recog¬

nizing this problem, have begun to investigate alternative modes
of

CAI which turn over control of the learning experience to

the student.

In Chapter V we examine their efforts with respect

to existential educational philosophy.

3,

Indirect Psychological Influences
In the two previous sections we examined the existential

implications of administrative data banks and CAI.

These are

circumstances in which some overt action is taken—a student s
file becomes part of an educational data bank or he participates
in a CAI lesson.
of a computer.

The student is directly affected by the presence
Here we propose to examine the more subtle

influences of the computer within an educational environment.
We ask:

Does the computer, by its mere presence, have a psycho¬

logical impact on students,
this influence?

and,

if

so, what is the nature of

We answer this question affirmatively.

it must be stressed that this is a tentative answer.
is

complex and has not been researched.

However,

The question

What follows should be
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considered only as the speculations of this author and his
rationale for such.
We begin by acknowledging some merit to Marshall McLuhan's
thesis, "the medium is the message," and then proceed to specu¬
late upon the "message" intrinsic to the computer.

McLuhan, in

his Understanding Media, issues a strong warning to beware of
the naive notion, so often heard with respect to the computer,
that technology is neutral and it is how it is used that is
important:
The electronic technology is within the gates,
and we are numb, deaf, blind, and mute about
its encounter with the Gutenberg technology,
on and through which the American way of life
was formed.
It is, however, no time to suggest
strategies when the threat has not even been
acknowledged to exist.
I am in the position of
Louis Pasteur telling doctors that their greatest
enemy was quite invisible, and quite unrecog¬
nized by them.
Our conventional response to all
media, namely that it is how they are used that
counts, is the numb stance of a technological
idiot,

McLuhan has much to say about the subtle influences of elec¬
tronic technology.

It is our intention here to bypass the intri

cate detail of McLuhan’s work, and simply emphasize his point
that electronic technology is not simply some neutral tool,
to be used for good or evil purposes.

We ask:

What message,

what values does the electronic digital computer communicate by
its mere presence in our environment?

Our investigation is

similar to that of the cultural anthropologist who endeavors to
draw conclusions about an

ancient civilization by examining
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the physical artifacts of that civilization,
Although it is possible to find many "messages" within
the computer, the most obvious is the high value our culture
places on the objective scientific approach to problemsolving,

More specifically, the computer can be visualized

as the twentieth century epitome of rationalism.

And, to the

degree that the computer finds enthusiastic acceptance within
the school, the message of the value of rationalism is trans¬
mitted to students.
The existentialist would be concerned about the impact of
the message of rationalism upon students.

Carruth effectively

articulates the existential position on rationalism:

Existentialism is a recoil from rationalism.
Not that existentialists deny the role of
reason, they merely insist that its limits
be acknowledged.
Most of them would probably
like to think their speculations are eminently
reasonable, yet not rational; and they empha¬
size the distinction between terms.16

As was mentioned in the previous chapter, very little work
has been done by the prominent existentialists in the area of
epistemology.

They are inclined to accept various methods of

arriving at truth, including rationalism, but also insist on
a subjective path to truth.
Morris.)

(This was labeled "Mode Two" by

However, one leading existentialist, Martin Heidegger,

has examined the nature of thinking, and his analysis is significant within the context

of educational computing.

Heidegger

63
distinguishes between two types of thinking, calculative
thinking and meditative thinking:

Whenever we plan, research, and organize, we
always reckon with conditions that are given.
We take them into account with the calculated
intention of their serving specific purposes.
Thus we can count on definite results.
This
calculation is the mark of all thinking that
plans and investigates.
Such thinking remains
calculation even if it neither works with
numbers nor uses an adding machine or computer.
Calculative thinking races from one prospect
to the next.
Calculative thinking never stops,
never collects itself.
Calculative thinking
is not meditative thinking, not thinking which
contemplates the meaning which reigns in every¬
thing that is.

Heidegger defines man as a "meditative being" and indicates
that his obsession with calculative thinking is symptomatic of
man's flight from the essence of his humanity.

Thus, although

Heidegger does not address the impact of educational computing,
it seems reasonable to conclude that he and other existentialists
would take an opposing position if the computer were to dominate
the educational environment in perpetuating the value of calcu¬
lative thinking at the expense of meditative thinking.
The fact that educational technology can affect the atmos¬
phere of the school has not been generally recognized.
Charles Silberman in Crisis in the Classroom is an exception.
He quotes Emmanuel Mesthene, Director of the Harvard Program on
Technology and Society, who seems to echo McLuhan:

’What's good for educational technologists,
Emmanuel Mesthene dryly warns, ’is not neces¬
sarily good for education,'
The problem is
part of a more general one,
'Our technologies
today are so powerful, so prevalent, so delib¬
erately fostered, and so prominent in the
awareness of people,' Mesthene argues, 'that
they not only bring about changes in the
physical world •— which technologies have
always done — but also in our institutions,
attitudes and expectations, values, goals, and
in our very conception of the meaning of exis¬
tence . ' IS

Although neither Silberman nor Mesthene identify themselves
as existentialists, their concern with values, goals, and the
meaning of existence as it relates to educational technology
reflects a sympathy toward the existential position.
Next, we proceed to an even deeper level and speculate upon
the possibility of the computer influencing the student's
concept of identity.

Previously, when discussing Schachtel s

notion of a "paper-identity," we were concerned with the student
coming to identify himself with the image protrayed by the infor
mation contained in a data bank.

The content of the data bank

may influence the student to conceive of himself as bright,
dull, introverted, extroverted, creative, etc.

It should be noted

that each adjective depicts a quality which has historically been
unique to human beings.

Thus, even if the student came to

picture himself as lacking in creativity, he was at least an
uncreative human being.

We now suggest what, upon initial inspec¬

tion seems almost preposterous, namely, that the presence of the
computer can be instrumental toward influencing the child to
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incorporate a mechanistic self-image.
We begin by indicating that the issue of man being likened to
a machine cannot be all that preposterous in that it has received
the attention of serious philosophers during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries as a theoretical issue.

And, since the

advent of actual mechanical "thinking" machines, most recently
exemplified by the general-purpose digital computer, this idea,
called mechanism, has been revived by modern philosophers of
science. 19
However, in that philosophers have also discussed angels
dancing on the heads of pins, mere discussion of mechanism does
not necessarily imply philosophical significance.
interest is psychological, not philosophical.

Our immediate

We are concerned

with an individual developing a warped sense of identity; that
of a machine.

(It is certainly questionable whether those

philosophers who defend mechanism really believe that they them¬
selves are machines.)

Dramatic evidence that a human being can

actually assume such a mechanical self-image has been documented
by Bruno Bettelheim in the case of Joey, a "mechanical boy":

Entering the dining room, for example, he would
string an imaginary wire from his ’energy source' an imaginary electric outlet - to the table.
There
he insulated himself with paper napkins and finally
plugged himself in.
Only then could Joey eat, for
he firmly believed that the 'current' ran his inges90

tive apparatus.^

Bettelheim indicates that Joey's story has general relevance
to understanding emotional development in a machine age, and
comments:
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It is unlikely that Joey's calamity could befall
a child in any time and culture but our own.
He suffered no physical deprivation; he starved for
human contact.21

It should be emphasized that Joey is an extreme case of
schizophrenia who suffered severe emotional deprivation before
seeking comfort and safety in the identity of a machine.
What is pondered here is nothing as dramatic as a future genera¬
tion of children adopting the identity of robots.

What is of

Interest is the cultural phenomenon which set the stage allowing
Joey to assume the identity of a mechanism.

We ask:

Does that

phenomenon, presuming that it does exist, have any influence,
however subtle, upon the development of self-identity in "normal"
children?

And, of greater pertinence with respect to educa¬

tional computing, would not the presence of

Intelligent

machines serve to amplify this phenomenon?
We assume an affirmative answer to the first question and
leave the determination of the specifics to the social psycholo¬
gist.

An answer to the second question, of course, presumes

the existence of "intelligent" machines — or, at least the future
existence of such machines.

By adopting a strictly behavioristic

interpretation of intelligence, we can and do make this assump¬
tion.22

The impact of this assumption of man's self-image Is

profoundly related by James Slagel:
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The presence of intelligent machines will
show man that he is not the only intelligent
creature.
The effect of this on man's image
of himself will be even greater than the
effect of man's realization that he inhabits
a minor planet revolving around a minor
galaxy, or the realization that he evolved
from lower forms of life.
One of his more
cherished, if not his most cherished, claims
to uniqueness, that is, his intelligence,
will be matched by a "mere" machine.23

Scholarly discussion and debate surrounding the existence
and implications of intelligent machines have been published in
academic journals during the past three decades.

However, this

literature was esoteric from the viewpoint of the layman.
Although there exists little evidence upon which to draw con¬
clusions regarding the layman's response to intelligent machinery,
the public reaction to an article about "Shakey - The First
Electronic Person" in a recent issue of Life Magazine indicates
o/

that it is a disturbing notion for many people.
The average person prefers to believe that human beings are
special and any attempt to alter this belief is met with resis¬
tance.

This "being special" is easily demonstrated by his

intelligent behavior.
comfortable with it.

He feels confident in this belief and is
Indeed, it is a part of the individual s

identity as a human being.
We now return to the question of young children coming into
contact with machines which behave intelligently.

While the adult

with a healthy established identity either denounces the machine
or attempts to philosophize his way around the issue, the young

68
child does not have an established identity which intrinsically
rebels against a mechanistic model of himself.

With a sense of

concern, we ask if a child should not be sheltered from the
computer to some degree, especially during his early educational
experiences?

Howard Peelle is one of the few educators to enter¬

tain the potentially negative influences of an artificially
intelligent CAI system:

The controversy becomes more heated with the
mention of artificial intelligence, particu¬
larly mechanical mentors.
What fate will
befall education when machines become capable
of sensitive and intelligent interaction with
human beings?
Rosenthal’s studies of selffulfilling prophecy might suggest that chil¬
dren of tomorrow will mold to a new ortho¬
doxy - one of expected precision, pre-packaged
behavioral objectives and programmed responses.
Will students neglect humanistic values and
perhaps even emulate the computer?2-*

That educational computing, more specifically, artificially
intelligent CAI systems, may subtly influence the child to adopt
a mechanical self-image, is certainly open to debate.

However,

given the adverse implications of a mechanistic self-image,
it is worthy of consideration.
Perry London, in examining the machine model of man within
the general context of behavioral control, comments on

the danger

of this model:

The theoretical trouble with calling a man
a machine begins when it is clear that someone
believes the statement is true, and not mere y
a figure of speech; the practical trouble begins
when anyone can act as if it were true, whether
he believes it or not.26
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London continues by examining the dangers of the mechan¬
istic model of man from a humanistic perspective of morality;

There are two important reasons for fearing
the easy application of mechanistic theory
to morality:
it may encourage an impersonal
approach to human beings, and it may dis¬
courage personal responsibility for one’s
conduct.27

Although London does not identify himself as an existen¬
tialist, his concern for a personal approach to people and respon¬
sibility for one's actions are essentially that of the existen¬
tialist.

And, for just the same reasons, the existentialist is

critical of the machine model of man.

Thus, to the degree that

an intelligent CAI system communicates this model of man, it
would be unwelcome by an educator who is advocating an exis¬
tential philosophy of education.

C.

Philosophical Insights;
Educational Computing

Beyond the Negative Dimension of

In this section the question is raised:

Why not, in light of the

aforementioned dangers inherent in educational computing, simply deny
the computer entrance to the school house?

The author, while acknowledg¬

ing the legitimacy of this response, decides not to endorse such a course
of action.

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to articulating

the philosophical rationale behind this decision.
We begin by emphasizing that the potential dangers specified in
the previous section were psychological, not philosophical.

Educational

computing could subtlely influence both students and educators to lose
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of their existential condition.

However, educational computing does

not overtly present an intellectual argument that can effectively
persuade those individuals to reject the existential position.
In our concern with the indirect negative psychological influ¬
ences of educational computing, we must speculate on the cause of
susceptability to these influences.

The author contends that the

primary source of this problem is the void with respect to an estab¬
lished conscious philosophy of education.

Into this void creeps the

unspoken "philosophy" of pragmaticism, efficiency and objectivity of
our modern culture (see Chapter II).

To avoid this condition, the

author recommends the adoption of an existential philosophy of
education.

If the prerequisite existential environment were estab¬

lished, the pitfalls associated with educational computing would be
minimizing.

This is an important "if."

It is a primary motivation

behind this author’s advocacy of an existential philosophy.

For, ulti

mately, it is the absence of such a philosophy which sets the stage
for the aforementioned negative psychological influences.
In developing a philosophy of educational computing, it is
imperative that there be no inconsistencies between the basic exis¬
tential tenets as outlined in the previous chapter and the philosophic
insights provided by the science o£ cybernetics.

Here we briefly

describe cybernetics as a broad theoretical framework encompassing
digital computing.

Unfortunately, because cybernetics is a science,

and existentialism is often associated with anti-scientific sentiments,
many educators draw the erroneous conclusion that cybernetics and
existentialism are intellectually incompatible.

In the following
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sections the author will attempt to further and draw upon cybernetic
insights in defense of the existential position.

This is not to say

that there is any necessary association between these two bodies of
knowledge.

The author intends only to convince the existential

educator that cybernetics does not present a philosophical challenge
to his position.

Then he may be convinced to give the computer

a chance within his classroom.
Before we examine these philosophical issues, it is worth stating
a "realistic," though nevertheless existential, objection to rejecting
educational computing.

In general, the existentialist acknowledges

the impossibility of establishing a vacuum devoid of influences
contrary to his position (in particular, this applies to educational
computing).

In fact, it is his unwillingness to accept and his naive

or simplistic approach to education, or life in general, that sets him
apart from the traditional philosophers.

And he recognizes that exis¬

tential growth of the individual can only occur when the individual
confronts, struggles with, and overcomes influences which are
dehumanizing,
While we are discussing this issue philosophically, Pandora’s Box
has been opened.
non-existence.

The computer is here and it cannot be banished into
The existential educator, in accepting this reality,

must therefore meet the challenge and learn to control the computer.
He must also guide his students in their association with educational
computing.

The pitfalls of educational computing can be minimized by

establishing an educational environment which reflects an existential
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philosophy of education.

They cannot be completely eliminated.

Thus, the existential educator must move beyond these pitfalls by
developing an understanding of the computer within his philosophical
perspective.

1.

Cybernetics:

An Introductory Overview

During the 1940’s and 1950's Norbert Wiener and his associates
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology began investigating
analogies of control between animals and machines.

He named this new

science "cybernetics," which he derived from the Greek term
"kybernetike" meaning the art of steersmanship.

Wiener’s definition

of cybernetics as "the study of control and communication in the animal
and the machine" has become the standard. ^

During the same time period

that Wiener was laying the foundation of cybernetic theory, the digital
computer was being developed.

The computer, being the most sophistica¬

ted control and communication mechanism ever invented, proved invaluable
in cybernetic research.
In the broadest sense of the term, "cybernetics" is the study of
control and communication per se, without reference to specific
scientific disciplines.

However, research in artificial intelligence

and automata theory has often been equated with cybernetics.
Artificial Intelligence. (A.I.) involves the programming of compu¬
ters to perform tasks which require some measure of "intelligence.
Examples of such programs already developed are those which play
checkers, solve algebra and calculus problems, and prove mathematical
theorems.29

According to Minsky, A.I. involves the application of
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algorithmic and heuristic techniques to global problems of search,
pattern recognition, learning, planning, and induction.30
Whereas researchers in A.I. endeavor to actually construct
programs which behave intelligently, those involved with automata
theory focus on the abstract structure of various classes of computers.
Theirs is a theoretical investigation of the formal properties of
computers without immediate concern toward the actual construction of
the

machines

they study.

Arbib offers a more precise definition of

automata theory as "the pure mathematics of computer science...con¬
cerned with understanding the capabilities and limitations of whole
classes of automata."3^
The relevancy of cybernetic concepts extends far beyond the
esoteric areas of artificial intelligence and automata theory.

Neuro¬

physiologists, psychologists, management theorists, and practitioners
within other scientific disciplines have found cybernetic models
useful when examining communication and control functions within
their respective disciplines.

Wiener himself, in his The Human Use of

Human Beings, argues for the most comprehensive application of
cybernetic thought, that of the social sciences.

He states:

It is the thesis of this book that society
can only be understood through a study of
the messages and the communication facilities
which belong to it; and that in the future
development of these messages and communica¬
tion facilities, messages between man and
machines, between machines and man, and be¬
tween machine and machine, are destined to
play an ever-increasing part.^
Given that cybernetics has such a profound impact in providing
new models for both the physical and social sciences, it is only
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natural that philosophers begin their examination of this new subject.
We turn our attention to the issues raised by these lovers of wisdom
in the following two sections.

2,

Existential Man vs. Mechanism;

A Cybernetic Perspective

You will recall that in Chapter III the point was made that exis¬
tentialism is first and foremost a philosophy of man—specifically,
man as a subjective being.

The task of the existential philosopher

is to examine this unique and profound dimension of man.

In this

section we focus upon the science of cybernetics, in particular the
area of artificial intelligence, and speculate upon its implications
with respect to our subjective notion of man.

Kenneth Sayre, in his

Philosophy and Cybernetics, effectively articulates the nature and
significance of this issue:

Given the ability of machines to learn, act
purposefully, and perform tasks which with the
human agent require mental skills, it is un¬
avoidable that the question arises whether man
himself is anything more than a cybernetic
system, constructed of organic rather than
inorganic parts... .
The question of the signi
ficance of artificially intelligent mechanical
systems is one of the most pressing philosophical
issues of the present day.33
Sayre, in presenting his own analysis of this question argues as
a philosopher of science, not an existentialist.

However, this author

while taking the existential position, finds Sayre's analysis both
enlightening and appealing.

His conclusion—that mechanism is not

subject to empirical verification—is consistent with the existen¬

tialist ,

but in no way belittles or sets

limits upon cybernetic research.
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Much of what follows in this section is dependent upon Sayre's
excellent analysis.
In attempting to evaluate the "organic machine" concept of man,
Sayre specifies a crucial distinction between two propositions which
he labels A and M:

Mechanism may be represented by the thesis (M) that
all men are machines.
Arguments both for and
against mechanism, on the basis of cybernetic consi>derations, owe their persuasiveness to the logical
relations between M and the thesis (A) that machines
can do everything men can do.
Although M entails A,
the converse does not hold, for it is possible that
men and machines do the same things but do them in
irreducibly different ways.34

Some philosophers, in challenging the validity of M, have tried
to identify some human behavior which a machine was incapable of dupli¬
cating.

Then, having shown A to be false by counterexample,

evoke a "not-A,
valid.

therefore not-M" argument to disprove M.

they would

The logic is

The debate centers around the identification of a given

behavior to establish a counterexample to A.
This author, speaking from an existential position, does not
attempt to disprove A (and thus M) by aligning himself with those who,
like Hubert Dreyfus, claim to have found such counterexamples.^
Instead, the bold assumption is made here that at some point in the
future a machine will indeed be able to duplicate all human behavior.
This statement is premised upon current and projected successes in A.I.
and the theoretical possibility of such as indicated by automata theory
At this point in time, this assumption is at best scientific specula¬
tion which must await significant engineering advances for verification
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The existentialist, by postulating the subjective dimension of man,
does not endeavor to reject M by empirical demonstration of a counter¬
example to A.

Rather, he believes that it is more effective to

accentuate Sayre’s distinction between A and M.

This captures the

crucial difference between DOING (A) and BEING (M).

Noting this

important philosophical distinction, this author concurs with Sayre
regarding the impossibility of empirical verification of M.

...the remarkable advances in artificial intel¬
ligence over the past decade do not in them¬
selves alter the philosophic status of the
mechanist thesis.
Mechanism remains a matter
of philosophic persuasion and has not been
altered into an issue admitting definitive
settlement by empirical considerations.36

It is important to recognize that Sayre’s position is that of
a scientific philosopher.

Cybernetics, being a science, is bounded

by the limitations of the scientific method.

It can only legitimately

ask and answer questions which are subject to empirical verification
by sense observation.

All other questions are considered meaningless.

What men and machines can DO is empirical and therefore meaningful.
What man IS is a metaphysical question and

therefore

within the domain of the philosophy of science.

meaningless

The existentialist,

being of a different "philosophic persuasion" than the scientific
philosopher, finds this question not just meaningful, but of central
philosophic concern.
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3.

Existentialism and Cybernetics
The intention of the previous section was to illustrate the

absence of any intellectual inconsistency between the science of
cybernetics and the existential concept of man.

Although the exis¬

tentialist may be justifiably concerned over the psychological
impact of the cybernetic revolution, he should not perceive cyber¬
netics as a philosophical threat to his position.
a science.

Cybernetics is

It is not a philosophy, even though it may be subject to

philosophic interpretation.

And, as we shall see in Chapter V,

science, in general, and therefore cybernetics in particular, poses
no threat to the existential position.
The purpose of this section is to examine some of the results of
cybernetic research.

Here we will do what is not permitted within

the structure of pure scientific research, namely, place philosophical
interpretations upon the conclusions of the cybernetics.

Our inten¬

tion is to illustrate that, assuming one has already made the "leap"
into existentialism, cybernetics, rather than merely being tolerated,
may be viewed positively.

Specifically, existential interpretations

will be attached to cybernetic conclusions to reinforce the exis¬
tential position with respect to the issues of rationalism, intelli¬
gence, and behavior,
a.

Rationalism
Earlier in this chapter we referred to Carruth in specifying

the existential position regarding rationalism - "Existentialism
is a recoil from rationalism.

Not that the existentialists deny
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the role of reason, they merely insist that its limits
be acknowledged.

The existentialists’ claim is tradi¬

tionally based upon their awareness of significant philo¬
sophical insights found only within the subjective domain.
A classic example of this attitude was found in Blaise
Pascal, himself gifted with a brilliant rational mind.
Pascal was both the father of probability theory and, of
more direct interest, the inventor of the first mechanical
adding machine.

Barrett, in his Irrational Man, classifies

Pascal as an existentialist.

He draws the distinction

between Pascal’s thought and that of other philosophers
who discussed existential themes but are better described
as precursors of existential thought.

Barrett’s primary

reason for categorizing Pascal as an existentialist is
Pascal’s bold distinction between the mathematical mind
("1’esprit de geometrie") and the intuitive mind
(’’l’esprit de finesse"):

What Pascal had really seen, then,
in order to have arrived at this
distinction was this: that man
himself is a creature of contradic¬
tions and ambivalences such as pure
logic can never grasp... By delimit¬
ing a sphere of intuition over against
that of logic, Pascal had, of course,
set limits to human reason. -3°
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All existentialists, in the spirit of Pascal, assert
the existence and priority of the intuitive mind and, in
doing so, postulate limitations to the purely rational path
to philosophic truth.

However, it also happens that the

limitations of the rational method can be demonstrated by
application of the rational method itself.

In the early

1930’s, Kurt Godel established two theorems in the realm of
metamathematics which are of profound significance to the
philosopher of science.

Essentially, Godel was able to

demonstrate two important limitations to any purely
rational system of thought.

The essence of these two

theorems, which have become known as Godel's Incompleteness
Theorems, is best illustrated by Howard DeLong, who has
"translated" them into both the languages of physics and
psychology:

Godel’s First Incompleteness Theorem:
Language of physics - There is no consis¬
tent machine which can be programmed
to produce all the true and only true
sentences of arithmetic.
Language of psychology - There is no consis¬
tent human capable of formulating a
program, which if carried out, would
produce all the true and only true sen¬
tences of arithmetic.
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Godel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem:
Language of physics - No consistent machine
can be programmed to prove its own
consistency.
Language of psychology - No consistent human
can prove his own consistency.39

»•

Godel developed his limitative theorems within the
framework of the philosophy of mathematics.

With the advent of

the digital computer, and thus automata theory, parallel proofs
of Godel’s theorems were developed by automata theorists.
The existentialist, in examining the implications of the
digital computer, should be aware of Godel's theorems as
reinforcing his position on rationalism.

However, few exis¬

tentialists have given any indication of such.

DeLong comments

that, "So far as I know, the leading existentialists are
completely innocent of any knowledge of the limitative
theorems.
This author has found only one exception to DeLong’s obser¬
vation.

Barrett,

taking an existential perspective, comments

on the implications of Godel’s theorems:

Godel's findings seem to have even more
far-reaching consequence, when one consi¬
ders that in the Western tradition, from
the Pythagoreans and Plato onward, mathe¬
matics as the very model of intelligibility,
has been the central citadel of rationalism.
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Now it turns out that even in his
most precise science — in the province
where his reason had seemed omnipotent man cannot escape his essential finitude:
every system of mathematics that he con¬
structs is doomed to incompleteness.
Godel has shown that mathematics contains
insoluble problems, and hence can never
be formalized in any complete system.
This means, in other words, that mathe¬
matics can never be turned over to a giant
computing machine; it will always be un¬
finished, and therefore mathematicians the human beings who construct mathematics will always be in business.
The human ele¬
ment here rises above the machine:
mathematics is unfinished as is any human
life.41

Thus we see that there are inherent limitations within
the rational method.

However, it should be recognized by

the existentialist that it is to the credit of rationalism
for displaying its own limitations.

Also,

it should be recog¬

nized that these limitations imply that mathematics will
always remain an unfinished enterprise - an unending, rich
and exciting domain for the creative mind to explore.
These limitations are the subject of our existential
interpretation of rationalism.

Again we turn to Barrett for

his analysis:

But since mathematics can never be completed,
it might be argued that Godel’s findings show
us that there are no limits to mathematical
knowledge.
True, in one sense; but in another
sense it sets a more drastic limitation upon
mathematical knowledge, since mathematicians
now know they can never, formally speaking,
reach bottom; in fact, there is no rock bottom,
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since mathematics haB no selfsubsistent
reality independent of the human activity
that mathematicians carry on.
And if
human reason can never reach rock bottom
(complete systematization) in mathematics,
it is not likely to reach it anywhere else.
There is no System possible for human exis¬
tence, Kierkegaard said a century ago,
differing with Hegel, who wished to enclose
reality within a completely rational struc¬
ture; the System is impossible for mathe¬
matics, Godel tells us today.^2

It is important to avoid the error of concluding that
Godel's demonstration of the limitations of the rational
method, and thus of computing devices, provides proof of
man's superiority to machines.

Godel's theorems apply to

the method per se, not to the agent which employs the method.
Thus, Godel's theorems cannot be referenced as an illustration
of a fundamental difference between men and machines.

They

can only demonstrate limitations to a method of investigation
about which existentialists have long held reservations.
Again, if the existentialist claims to have knowledge of
phenomena beyond the rational, then he does so by virtue of
his "leap" into this philosophic domain of subjectivity, not
by rational demonstration.
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b.

Intelligence
In the previous section we examined rationalism,

a particular epistemology which has appealed to Western phil¬
osophers in their pursuit of truth, and made reference to
Godel's Incompleteness Theorems to reinforce the existential¬
ist’s contention regarding its limitations.

We now expand

our range of interest to focus on intelligence per se.
The underlying epistemology may be rationalism, empiricism,
or some blend of these two.

Our intention is to argue the

existential point that intelligence is neither the primary
nor uniquely identifying characteristic of man.

Here the

term "intelligence" is to be interpreted in a strictly be¬
havioristic sense, equivalent to Heidegger's "calculative
thinking."

It is distinct from Heidegger’s "meditative think¬

ing," which has no immediate or necessary behavioristic mani¬
festations and is representative of the subjective dimension
of man which is unique to him alone.
The argument is simple and direct.
indicates that beings

other than man

If research into A,I.
in this case, the

digital computer—are intelligent, then intelligence cannot
be interpreted as the primary identifying characteristic of
man which sets him apart from the rest of creation.

Slagel

captures the essence of this argument in the following comments
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The presence of intelligent machines
will show man that he is not the only
intelligent creature.
The effect of
this on man’s image of himself will be
even greater than the effect of man's
realization that he inhabits a minor
planet revolving around a minor sun in
a minor galaxy, or the realization that
he evolved from lower forms of life.
One of his most cherished, if not his
most cherished, claims to uniqueness,
that is, his intelligence, will be
matched by a 'mere' machine.43

A hint of the logic behind this argument can also be
detected in an amusing essay by Bertrand Russell entitled
"An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish'";

Aristotle, so far as I know, was the first
man to proclaim explicitly that man is a
rational animal.
His reason for this view
was one which does not now seem very impres¬
sive; it was, that some people can do sums.
...Nowadays, however, calculating machines
do sums better than even the cleverist people,
yet no one contends that these useful instru¬
ments are immortal, or work by divine inspira¬
tion.
As arithmetic has grown easier, it has
become less respected.
The consequence is
that, though many philosophers continue to
tell us what fine fellows we are, it is no
longer on account of our arithmetical skill
that they praise us.^

Although it would be inaccurate to call either Russell or
Slagel existentialists, the existentialist should appreciate
the logic in their statements as supportive of his position.
The presence of "intelligent" machines has stimulated much
discussion regarding the nature of intelligence.

The continued
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success In A. I.

research has forced a changing definition

intelligence, influencing J. P. Echert, a pioneer in
the development of the digital computer, to comment:
"I've finally been forced to adopt the definition that
thinking is what computers cannot do.

This definition

is very workable since it changes from year to year as
computer progress is made."^
If one presumes, as this writer does, that at some
point in the future computers will be capable of simula¬
ting any type of intelligent behavior, then Echert's
definition of "thinking" becomes null for those who
would only acknowledge the existence of "calculative"
thinking.

This is fine to the existentialist, for in

postulating the existence of "meditative" thinking, man
is still valued because he is uniquely "man" - a medita¬
tive/subjective being - not because he demonstrates the
useful quality of intelligence in a behavioristic sense.

c.

Behavior
In the previous section it was argued that the exis¬

tence of intelligent machines reinforced the existential
contention regarding the secondary position of behavior¬
istic intelligence (calculative thinking) as a charac¬
teristic of man.

Here a parallel argument is proposed

by finally extending the domain of discourse from intel¬
ligent behavior to behavior per se.
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From a strictly philosophical perspective, the exis¬
tentialist holds that man is "defined" by what he IS
(a subjective being), not by what he DOES (behavior).
And, once man IS - exists aware of his subjectivity - he
further defines himself via his choosing.
say that behavior is not important.
site is maintained.

This is not to

Rather, just the oppo¬

However, it is man as a subjective being

who initiates the behavior by a nonbehavioristic choice.
And it is man as a subjective being who experiences the exis¬
tential anxiety in choosing and who is responsible for the
consequences of his choosing.

Thus, behavior per se, is

considered secondary to subjective choice by man.
Now, turning our attention toward a specialized area of
A.I. research, that of robiotics, we can reinforce the exis¬
tential position on behavior.

Arguing in a vein similar to

that proposed in the previous section on intelligence, we
state that it is erroneous to seek a definition of "humanity
in terms of behavior alone.

Of course, it is the assumption

that robots will actually evolve to the androids of science
fiction literature which is the weakest link in this position.
And, admittedly, this is at best scientific speculation at
this point in time.
dation.

Yet, it is not speculation without foun¬

Researchers at Stanford have already constructed
46

a robot which was "science fiction" only a few decades ago.
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Although the behavior of this robot, and all others
built to date, is quite unsophisticated in comparison
to human behavior, it should persuade most observers
that no more than a few hundred years of technological
evolution will be necessary for robots to catch up
to humans.
Only future events will definitively establish the
behavioristic equivalence of men and machines.

The dog¬

matic empiricist will demand the actual construction of
such an android.

However, it is of tremendous impor¬

tance that there exists no theoretical barriers to this
task.

This has been demonstrated by automata theorists

in proving the logical equivalence of a finite automata
(a formal computer) and a neural net
the nervous system).^

(a formal model of

Essentially, this means that

the construction of robots capable of simulating human
behavior is exclusively an engineering problem, albeit
a formidable one.

Seymour Papert, one of the more

creative individuals in CAI research, has specifically
argued this point in refuting Hubert Dreyfus, a philo¬
sopher who claims that there are limitations to the
potentiality of AI research.

48

In arguing against the priority of behavior within
an ontological investigation of man, there are other cyber¬
netic insights which the existentialist may draw upon.
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The problematic relationship between a system's
structure and its behavior is of central concern to the
cybernetician.

Although his goal is to predict the be¬

havior of a known structure, and conversely, to determine
a system's structure by examining its behavior (the "black
box" problem), the cybernetician is among the first to
acknowledge the perplexing nature of this relationship.
Charles Dechert precisely articulates this enigma:

It is entirely possible, of course,
that structurally diverse systems
may effect identical transformations,
and that structurally identical sys¬
tems of a sufficient degree of com¬
plexity may produce very different
outputs on the basis of identical
inputs.49

Therefore, in recognition of this condition, the exis¬
tentialist can effectively argue against those who advocate
mechanism ("All men are machines")

if and when robots are

constructed which are behaviorly equivalent to human beings.
Men and machines "may effect identical transformations,'

but

they may still be "structurally diverse systems."
In this section we have been using the term "behavior”
in the conventional sense as the layman would interpret it.
Next we focus upon the psychology of strict stimulus-response
"behaviorism" as professed by Skinner.
Clearly, the existentialist is at odds with the behavionst

model of man.

In fact, it is for this reason that some
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psychologists of the rival "third force" human potential
movement have turned to existentialism in search of
a philosophical foundation for their psychological posi¬
tion.

Abraham Maslow, often referred to as the father

of this recent movement in psychology, credits the exis¬
tentialists for offering a more acceptable image of man
than those proposed by both the Freudians and behaviorists.
He states, in an essay entitled "What Psychology Can Learn
from Existentialists" that:

We can, and should, pick up their
greater emphasis on what they call
"philosophical anthropology," that
is, the attempt to define man, and
the differences between man and any
other species, between man and
objects, and between man and robots.
What are his unique and defining
characteristics? What is so essen¬
tial to man that without it he would
no longer be defined as man?50

The existentialist and many humanistic psychologists
postulate the subjectivity of man as capturing his unique¬
ness,

They must postulate this because it is impossible

to demonstrate in the scientific sense.

Actually, it is

the Skinnerian behaviorist who is capable of offering
a scientific defense of his stimulus-response model of
man.

However, the existentialist may again find some

interest in a cybernetic rejection of the stimulus*response model.

We turn to Michael Arbib who argues

against this model:
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In short, we cannot expect a full
understanding of human mental
processes if we follow those
psychologists who view the organism
as responding passively to a series
of stimuli in a way which can be
manipulated by some schedule of
reinforcement.
Rather, we must
include a description of the inter¬
nal state of the system which deter¬
mines what the organism will extract
from its current stimulation in
determining its current actions and
modifying its internal state.51

Arbib, in arguing for the necessity of some internal
state within an organism, proposes the cybernetic model
as being superior to the stimulus-response model.
He certainly is not defending the existential "model."
His position is entirely within the scientific area.
However, he does effectively challenge the purely
behaviorist model of man - something for which the
existentialist should be grateful.
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D.

Concluding Comments
The primary intent of this chapter has been to outline the

potential dangers to an existential education inherent within educa¬
tional computing and then move beyond those dangers.

The approach

was to illustrate that the problems exist within the realm of psychology,
and that an examination of the philosophic insights provided by cyber¬
netics displayed no necessary inconsistencies with existential tenets.
Thereafter, it was claimed that the existentialist, in placing his own
interpretation on cybernetic advances, could reinforce his own conten¬
tions regarding the secondary philosophic importance of rationalism,
any form of behavioristic intelligence, and finally, behavior per se.
Turning to the educational implications of this analysis, we simply
note that the underlying concepts of an existential education remain
unaltered.

However,

in the areas of educational policy and practice,

those existentialists who would bar the computer from the school house
can only claim personal preference as their justification.

Since the

computer is not necessarily incompatible with an existential education,
this author, as an advocate of existential philosophy, can legitimately
research and recommend specific educational policy and practice
pertaining to educational computing.
devoted to this purpose.

The next and final chapter is
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CHAPTER V

EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND PRACTICES

This concluding chapter is devoted to the examination of specific
educational policy and practices which the author feels to be consistent
with the philosophy of educational computing presented in Chapter IV.
In particular,

the issues of educational curriculum, methodology, and

administration will be treated.
The author recognizes that the concepts of curriculum, methodology,
and administration usually imply the presence of some educational institu¬
tion which further implies a collectiveness and rigidity contrary to the
individuality and openness advocated by existentialists.

Therefore,

the reader is advised to interpret these terms in the most unrestricted
sense,
The reader should also bear in mind that the priority of freedom
within an existential educational experience practically eliminates the
exposition of specific educational policy and practices for adoption by
all existentialists.

(This helps to account for the fact that very little

has been said by existential educators beyond the outlining of general
philosophical principles.)

Therefore, what follows should in no way be

perceived as absolute or dogmatic.

Rather, the discussion of curriculum,

methodology, and administration, as they relate to educational computing,
is no more than an elaboration of the position of one person, the author,
and his rationale for its compatibility with the existential creed.
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Curriculum
In this section the author intends to defend the legitimacy of
computer science £er se within the curriculum of an educational
institution committed to existential principles.

The contention

that the curriculum be exclusively oriented toward the humanities
(in a restricted sense)

is rejected.

Rather, the openness of

the curriculum, and the freedom within it, as articulated by Dupuis,
is reaffirmed;

The existentialist is not so much concerned with
the actual courses or subjects in the curriculum
as he is with what the teacher and (most
especially) the student does with them.
The exercise of freedom within the curriculum
is more important than the curriculum content.^

The author firmly believes that computer science can be presented
to students at both the elementary and secondary levels in such
a manner that the goals of the existential educator are not jeopar¬
dized, but realized.

This position is grounded in the assumption

that the educator comprehends and, somehow effectively, communicates
to his students a valid "humanistic/existentialistic" perspective of
science in general, and cybernetics in particular.

The following

discussion of science and cybernetics is presented to convince the
reader that computer science, as is any area of scientific investiga
tion, is a uniquely human enterprise with a significant, subjective
dimension.

In other words, computer science can, and should be,

presented to the student as a subject within the humanities
broadest sense of the term).

(in the
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Science:

An Existential Commentary

To effectively argue for the inclusion of science in the
academic curriculum of an existential education requires
a comprehensive analysis of the scientific method and its
historical evolution.

Such is beyond the scope of this paper.

Instead, a brief discussion of (a)
and technology, and

(b)

the relationship of science

the domain and limitations of the scien¬

tific method is presented by referring to prominent scholars
and specifying their conclusions.

Readers, and especially exis¬

tential educators, are strongly encouraged to investigate the
original sources referenced for a more thorough analysis of
these issues.

a.

Technology and Science
One reason that existentialists and other humanists
take a disparaging view of science, and thus discourage
its inclusion within the curriculum is due to their
distress and anger at the dehumanizing conditions of
the twentieth century, made possible, promoted, and
aggravated by modern technology.

They make the accurate

observation that current technological advances have
their source in prior scientific research.

Generally,

the scientist makes a discovery pertaining to natural
phenomena;

the engineer then draws upon this new

scientific knowledge to produce some new technology.
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Although it is technology that is the "villain,"
criticism is often leveled at both science and
technology.

Strain's comments are restated as

being representative of this position:

In terms of its content, modern existen¬
tial thinking focuses on the human
person in a technological and scientific
age.
Many existentialists are pessi¬
mistic about modern life and indicate
that utopianism, based on science, is
an illusion.
They believe science and
technology have brought human beings
loneliness and alienation rather than
peace and progress.
The institutionaliza¬
tion of science, by and for the state,
has dehumanized man.2

In arguing the legitimacy of science within the
existential curriculum we begin by emphasizing that,
even though modern technology is often derived from
scientific research, science and technology are indeed
distinct.

Next, and perhaps more important, is the

little-recognized fact that technology based upon
science is a uniquely modern phenomenon; there is no
necessary correspondence between the two.

Lynn White,

a historian with particular interest in medieval
technology, informs us that:
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Until the middle of the nineteenth century
there were remarkably few connections
between science and technology, and the
influence of technology upon science seems
to have been greater than the reverse.
Science through the ages was purely an
intellectual effort to comprehend nature;
technology was the practical attempt to
use nature for human purposes.
While a
few individuals, like Friar Roger
Bacon, and Galileo, were interested in
both, they showed little interplay between
their practical and theoretical concerns.^

Thus we see that technology is not a necessary
by-product of scientific investigation.

Rather, it is

the obsessive pragmaticism of our modern culture which
compels technology to immediately follow scientific
advances, and even initiate the scientific research in
the first case.

Lilly sadly informs us of this

situation:

In the American tradition, one rushes to
the end of a research project digging up
all the basic facts needed to apply the
results practically to some technological
advances.
This seems to be the major basis
for research in America today:
a practical
result.^

Returning to the issue of science within the exis¬
tential curriculum, it is this writer's contention that
science, as a search for truth--the goal of both the
existential philosopher and the real scientist—should
be emphasized within an existential education.
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The pragmaticism, which dominates the experimental
curriculum, would be minimized.

This would not mean

the elimination of engineering from the curriculum.
It would imply that the spirit of science as an
effort to comprehend the natural world would prevail.
Hopefully,

this spirit would influence the community

of scientists and engineers to avoid the current
tendency of immediately applying scientific progress
toward technological endeavors.

The applications of

science would require a thoughtful decision, in the
existential sense involving personal responsibility
and anxiety, before the engineer applies his skills.

b.

The Domain and Limitations of Science
A second reason proposed by existential/humanistic
educators for de-emphasizing science within the curri¬
culum is that the scientific perspective offers too
narrow a view of man and the universe.

It is this

author's intention to draw an important distinction
between science per se and that brand of philosophy
of science which claims that truth can only be approached
via scientific investigation and that only scientifically
verifiable statements can be considered to be philoso¬
phically meaningful.
It should be noted then that a justifiable rejec¬
tion of the latter restrictive philosophy of science
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in no way implies a rejection of science itself.
It only implies the rejection of a particular
philosophical disposition toward science.
The position stated herein is that, although
the existential educator is naturally of a dif¬
ferent philosophical persuasion, science can
and should be part of the existential curriculum.
The rationale for this position is derived
from what this writer believes to be a legitimate
interpretation of science.

It is one thing to

postulate the philosophical significance of a domain
broader than the scientific; this is sufficient for
the confirmed existentialist.

It is another thing

to "objectively" analyze the scientific method and,
in doing so, simultaneously illustrate both its
limitations and its subjective/creative dimension:
this will not only reaffirm the existentialist, but
perhaps will also convert the experimentalist.
A thorough exposition of the legitimate domain
and limitations of the scientific method is a compre¬
hensive undertaking.

An excellent reference in this

respect is Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific
Revolution.

Here we only highlight Kuhn’s observa¬

tions and comment on their relevancy to existential
epistemology.
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Modern science has as its goal the deter¬
mination of truth with respect to the empirical
world.

Thus, naturally, any statements made by

the scientist must be subject to empirical veri¬
fication.

However, science is more than just

a collection of facts.

It has a theoretical compo¬

nent which requires the scientist to define a set
of axioms, which he claims to be empirically
verifiable, and then deduce theorems from these
axioms, which likewise must be empirically verified.
In this respect, the scientist parallels the rational
processes used by the mathematician.

And it is here

that the scientist must acknowledge the incomplete¬
ness of his system which Godel demonstrated by his
Incompleteness Theorems.-*
The recognition of the theoretical deductive
element within the scientific method also exposes the
necessity for creative thought in the selection of
initial axioms.

(Kuhn specifies the beginning of

a scientific revolution to be the "discovery" of a
new set of axioms which are logically consistent and
the theorems derived prove to be a more accurate
description of the empirical world.)
Therefore, due to its rational component, we see
that science not only suffers (and enjoys)

the same

incompleteness as mathematics, but it also requires
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a similar type of creative mind to produce
a rich set of initial axioms.

It is this

openness and creativity with respect to both
science and pure mathematics which justify
their position within the existential curri¬
culum.

And, granting the tremendous challenge

in doing so, it becomes the responsibility of
the existential educator to acquaint the student
with this dimension of science.

Unfortunately,

most educational institutions, existential and
otherwise, display little awareness of this
situation.
The existential educator should also be aware
that Kuhn's analysis of science implies an inter¬
pretation of the concept of truth which parallels
his own in removing the notion of one absolute
reality for the human mind:

We may, to be more precise, have to relinquish
the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes
in paradigm carry scientists and those who
learn from them closer and closer to truth.
. . .We are all deeply accustomed to seeing
science as the one enterprise that draws con¬
stantly nearer to some goal set by nature in
advance.
But need there be any such goal?
Can we not account for both science's exis¬
tence and its success in terms of evolution
from the community's state of knowledge at
any given time?
Does it really help to
imagine that there is some one full, objective
true account of nature and that the proper
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measure of scientific achievement is
the extent to which it brings us closer
to that ultimate goal?
If we can learn
to substitute evolution-from-what-we-doknow for evolution-toward-what-we-wishto-know, a number of vexing problems may
vanish in the process.6

Kuhn’s analysis of the scientific method effec¬
tively demonstrates the limitations of this method
in the determination of truth, and even questions the
existence of "truth" as an objective reality.

Unfor¬

tunately, the existentialist often overlooks such an
analytic verification of his position, which he has
simply assumed.
The previous comments on the distinction of science and technology and the limitations of science in capturing "truth" are on
the intellectual level and thus should be acknowledged by both
the scientist and the existentialist.

Karl Jaspers, in his essay,

"Philosophy and Science," asserts the recognition the philosopher
must afford the scientist.

Yet, he also recognizes that truth

extends beyond the domain of science.

The following statements by

Jaspers provide an insight into the relationship he sees between
science and philosophy:
There is no tenable philosophy outside the sciences.
Although conscious of its distinct character,
philosophy is inseparable from science.
It refuses
to transgress against universally binding insight.
Anyone who philosophizes must be familiar with
scientific method.
Any philosopher who is not trained in a scientific
discipline and who fails to keep his scientific
interests constantly alive will inevitably bungle
and stumble, and mistake uncritical rough drafts
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for definitive knowledge.
Unless an idea is subjected
to the coldly dispassionate test of scientific inquiry,
it is rapidly consumed in the fire of emotions and
passions, or else it withers into a dry and narrow
fanaticism.^

Jaspers emphasizes the importance of recognizing the limits to
the scientific method:

Moreover, anyone who philosophizes strives for scientific
knowledge; it is as though the most significant insights
could be achieved only through man's quest for the limit
at which cognition runs aground, not seemingly and tempo¬
rarily, but genuinely and definitively, not with a sense
of loss and despair, but with a sense of genuine internal
evidence.
Only definitive knowledge can make definitive
nonknowledge possible; it alone can achieve the authentic
failure which opens up a vista, not merely upon the dis¬
coverable existent, but upon being itself.
In accomplishing the great task of dispelling all magical
conceptions, modern science enters upon the path that
leads to the intuition of the true depth, the authentic
mystery, which becomes present only through the most
^
resolute knowledge in the consummation of nonknowledge.

Jaspers briefly summarizes his position:
To sum up: The sciences do not encompass all the truth
but only the exact knowledge that is binding to the
intellect and universally valid.
Truth has a greater
scope, and part of it can reveal itself only to philo¬
sophical reason.

It is this attitude of Kuhn, the philosopher of science, and Jaspers,
the existentialist, which should be recognized by existential educators and
communicated to students where science enters into the curriculum.
ever,

How¬

it is just this attitude which C. P. Snow, in his essays on

"Two Cultures," has lamented as being absent from the culture of modern
Western civilization.

His comments provide insight into a situation which.
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unfortunately, many scientists and existentialists continue
to perpetuate:

Over the years I became convinced that the whole
of Western society was being polarized, with the
literary intellectuals at one pole and the physical
scientists at the other.
Between the two was
mutual incomprehension, and the chance of talking
across this gap was getting less and less.
This
polarization resulted in immense loss to each group,
and in fact posed a great danger for our society as*
a whole.y

Snow comments that it would be wrong to be too impressed by
this historical trend and gives his reasons why efforts should be
made to reverse it:

If they are illiterate in science, then they are going
to take those decisions like a lawyer reading a brief.
That’s a terribly bad way to make a decision.10

Snow continues by stating his main reason for combating this
scientific and literary polarization;

My main reason is much simpler, much more emotional,
much more involved in what I feel about the whole of
the human species.
This absence of intellectual
communication is a symbol of the tendency of our
kind to find methods of ceasing to talk... These in
the long run mean death.H

The concern Snow expresses in the decision-making process,
and the lack of communication resulting in death for the human
species, has an existential ring.

With guarded optimism, he sees

education as being the only process by which the polarization trend
may be reversed.

It is a challenge which the existential educator
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must accept, from both a philosophic position as specified by
Jaspers, and a realistic concern for human survival as specified
by Snow.

2.

Cybernetics:

An Existential Commentary

Given that science should have a legitimate position within
the existential curriculum, it follows that the collection of
academic disciplines encompassed by cybernetics should be inves¬
tigated by elementary and secondary students.

The issue raised

at this point concerns the specific contribution cybernetics has
to offer as a subject within an existential curriculum.

Although

the following comments should provide some insight into this
matter, this topic is examined with the primary intention of
setting a challenge before the existential educator.
Cybernetics, in its broadest interpretation, is defined as
the science of control.

In capsulizing this perspective of cyber¬

netics as proposed by Stafford Beer, Peter Schoderbek notes its
interdisciplinary application:

Cybernetics is seen as the science whose object
of study is control.
It aims to study the nature
of control per se, control common to many fields
of investigation.
Hence, its interdisciplinary
nature, hence its relevance to industrial, social,
economic, mechanical, and biological systems.

The existentialist, in his concern for the individual as a being
capable of free choice and, therefore, being in control of his own
behavior,

should find the science of control of interest.

Unfor-
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tunately, most cybernetic research has a distinctly nonr
existential orientation.

It has primarily emphasized the objec¬

tive over the subjective, the collective over the individual, and
goal achievement over desirability of said goal.

Although this

approach may be necessary and entirely justifiable within the
pragmatic sphere, it is too restrictive within the existential.
Geoffrey Squires accurately expresses the nature of this situa¬
tion in stating that "the trouble with information—processing
is that it implies, at present, a very mechanistic and reduc¬
tionists view of how people work."13

The existentialist is

challenged to bring his own perspective to cybernetics and
hopefully move beyond this mechanistic, reductionistic approach.
Squires, in specifying the broad range of control systems, believes
this is possible, and credits John Lilly as being representative of
this approach:

Systems, after all, are found in biology and
ecology, as well as in engineering and opera¬
tions research.
As for information-processing
and the language of computing generally,
writers like Lilly can apply it to the human
organism without doing violence to notions of
choice, affectivity, religious experience and
the like.
Indeed, Lilly's work can be seen
as pioneering in this respect.1^

This author chooses to echo Squire’s endorsement of Lilly.
Lilly's Programming and Metaprogramming the Human Biocomputer
is a fascinating, although esoteric, attempt to tackle the mind<body problem, utilizing the vocabulary of the computer scientist
while avoiding mechanism.13

While Lilly’s ideas must be judged on
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their own merit, they do provide a model of an extension of
cybernetic concepts into the humanistic domain.
Another attempt to extend cybernetic concepts beyond
mechanism can be found in the writing of Gregory Bateson.
R. D. Lang, a leading existential psychiatrist, credits Bateson
for achieving a major theoretical advance in analysis of schizo¬
phrenic experiences:

This was the 'double-bind' hypothesis, whose
chief architect was the anthropologist
Gregory Bateson.
This theory...represented
a theoretical advance of the first order...
Bateson brought this paradigm of an insoluble
'can't win' situation, specifically destruc¬
tive of self-identity, to bear on the internal
communication pattern of families of diagnosed
schizophrenics.16

Bateson claims that his double-bind theory has its base "in
that part of communications theory which Russell has called the
Theory of Logical Types."17

Essentially, Bateson perceives the

double-bind concept as a cybernetic concept.

He has applied this

and other cybernetic concepts in the fields of psychology, anthro¬
pology, and epistemology.

In recognition of the productivity of

the cybernetic model, he states:

I think that cybernetics is the biggest bite
out of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge that
mankind has taken in the last 2,000 years.18

Yet, Bateson also displays the wisdom of not becoming

infatuated with this model:

Ill
Cybernetics has integrity within itself,
to help us not to be seduced by it into
more lunacy, but we cannot trust it to
keep us from sin.

Bateson, in an existential vein, warns us of the threat to
human responsibility if we focus only on cybernetic inventions
(e.g., computers).

Only by taking a more global perspective of

cybernetics does he see "the means of achieving a new and perhaps
more human outlook, a means of changing our philosophy of control,
and a means of seeing our own folly in wider perspective."^
Lilly and Bateson are unique examples of scholars capable of
utilizing cybernetic concepts without coming into conflict with
the existential position.

Both can be perceived as pioneers in

extending the cybernetic model into the domain of humanistic
thought.
Turning to a more conventional issue, the position of computer
science within the curriculum, we ask if there are any existential
insights to be discovered there.

This question is answered

affirmatively by referring to the previous chapter.

There it

was shown that artificial intelligence can lead the examiner to
a re-evaluation of the philosophic significance of intelligent
behavior.

And, within the discipline of automata theory, there

can be found certain limitations to machines.

While recognizing

that neither of these disciplines verifies the existential posi¬
tion,

they do illustrate the existential issues and provide food

for thought.
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The next section examines the role of educational computing as
a methodology.

Before turning to this topic, it is important to

note here that one particular technique of utilizing the computer
to teach traditional elementary and secondary subjects involves
computer programming on the part of the student.
this in detail below.

We will examine

It is mentioned here for the purpose of

noting an overlap between the inclusion of computer programming
within the curriculum and computer programming as a useful method¬
ology for teaching certain cognitive skills.
Methodology
In the previous chapter concern was expressed over the potential
negative implications of traditional CAI designed according to the
behavioristic model.

These programs usually incorporated the drill-

and—practice, or the tuotrial mode, with the dominant feature being
that the student was under the control of the system.

From an exis¬

tential perspective, this is undesirable as a general methodology.
In this section the reader will be exposed to the efforts of a rela
tively small group of educational technologists whose research is
premised on models other than behaviorism.

While none of these indi¬

viduals could be labeled "existentialist," their efforts are directed
toward a more humanistic approach to CAI, and to the degree that exis
tentialism is a humanism,

the methodologies proposed by these indivi¬

duals are compatible with an existential education.

It should be

noted that the primary intent of these alternative modes of CAI is
the same as traditional CAI:
However,

the teaching of cognitive skills.

their salient asset is that they attempt to do so without

jeopardizing the affective dimension of an existential/humanistic
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educational experience.
Although a variety of educational computing experiences
are proposed by these individuals, there is an underlying concept
common to all their work.

Namely, the student controls the

computing system, and thus controls his educational experience,
not the opposite as in behavioristic modes of CAI.

A most

appropriate way to capture the spirit of this approach is to
quote Seymour Papert's introductory comments in his
"Teaching Children Thinking''^

The phrase ’technology and education' usually
means inventing new gadgets to teach the same
old stuff in a thinly disguised version of
the same old way.
Moreover, if the gadgets
are computers, the same old teaching becomes
incredibly more expensive and biased toward
its dullest parts, namely, the kind of rote
learning in which measurable results can be
obtained by treating children like pigeons
in a Skinner box.
The purpose of this essay is to present a
grander vision of an educational system in
which technology is used not in the form of
machines for processing children, but as
something the child himself will learn to
manipulate, to extend, to apply to projects,
thereby gaining a greater and more articulate
mastery of the world, a sense of the power
of applied knowledge, and a self-confidently
realistic image of himself as an intellec¬
tual agent .21

Papert, working with elementary school students, has developed
a number of interesting projects to implement his idea of placing
the computer under the control of the student.

In most cases

the student actually programs the computer in order to concretize
and elucidate his thought process.

In order to facilitate
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the writing of programs by children, he has developed a special
programming language called LOGO and a unique peripheral device,
a turtle-robot which the children can control via instructions
written in LOGO.

By writing programs to manipulate the behavior

of the turtle (it can move along the floor and is equipped with
light, sound, and writing mechanisms), the student can observe
an embodiment of his procedure designed to achieve a particular
goal (e.g., make the turtle draw a polygon on the floor).
A very simple, but significant, point is that the student comes
to interpret misbehavior by the turtle as a "bug" in his program,
something to be fixed and tried again,
tive experience of "being wrong."

thereby avoiding the nega¬

Papert has also had students

write simple heuristic AI programs that play games of strategy
(e.g., NIM), and even has had students write traditional CAI
programs based on the premise that the best way to learn something
is to teach it.
By turning the computer over to the student, one is more
inclined to become involved in a project which encourages
a personal commitment toward some goal.

This personal involve¬

ment in an educational experience is favored by both experimen¬
talists and existentialists.

That such involvement also parallels

the work pattern of the artist, the existential ideal, is specified
by Papert:

The most exciting single aspect of the experiment
was that most children acquired the ability and
motivation to work on projects that extend in time
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over several days, and even weeks.
This is
in marked contrast with the usual in mathe¬
matics classes, where techniques are taught
and then applied to small repetitive exer¬
cise problems.
It is closer, in ways that
are essential to latter argument here, to
the work style of some art classes where
children work for several weeks on making
an object; a soapcarving, for example.
The similarity has several dimensions.
The first is that the duration of the process
is long enough for the child to become involved,
to try several ideas, to have the experience of
putting oneself in the final result, to compare
one's work with that of other children, to dis¬
cuss, to criticize and to be critized on some
basis other than 'right or wrong.'
The point
criticism is related to a sense of creativity
that is important in many ways...including its
role in helping the child develop a healthy
self-image as an active intellectual agent.22

Another educator sympathetic toward student control of compu
terlzed learning is Howard Peelle of the University of Massachu¬
setts.

Peelle is an advocate of a "glass box" approach to com¬

puter instruction which synthesizes ideas put forth by Seymour
Papert and IBM's Kenneth Iverson and Paul Berry.

He describes

this concept:

In this approach, short, quickly comprehensible
computer programs are given to elementary
school children for their direct viewing.
Each program embodies a concept, a procedure,
or an interrelationship, and is written as
simply and clearly as possible.
Here the
inner workings of the program are visible and,
hence, become a basis for learning.
This approach uses a computer program more as
The formal
a 'glass box' than a 'black box.'
definition of such a program serves to reveal
concepts; that is, by observing
and elucidate
of the program and its behavior,
the structure
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key understandings may become transparent
to the student.
In contrast to conventional computer-assisted instruction (CAI), this glass
box approach allows the student signi¬
ficant control over his learning processes.
Making the full power of the computer
accessible to the learner is 180° from
the kind of CAI characterized by programmed
instruction or drill^and-test sequences.23

Peelle illustrates the glass box concept with examples from
the areas of traditional CAI, psychology, cybernetics, and
computer art.

His description states that "student-initiated,

student-responsible,

success-oriented" activities can result from

a more imaginative approach to educational computing.
A third educator worthy of recognition for his contributions
in the instructional applications of computers is Thomas Dwyer
of the University of Pittsburgh.

Dwyer, probably more than any

other educator actively involved with educational computing,
emphasizes the significance and priority of sound educational
principles.

In an article entitled "Some Principles for the

Human Use of Computers in Education," he ties educational computing
into the humanistic approach to education:

The purpose of this paper is to provide a personal
view of some principles that are derived from
the humanistic point of view, but which are in¬
tended as a guide for programs exploring the use
of computers in education.
It is my conviction
that this simple ordering of priorities principles first, application second - is the
real key to successfully tapping the full potential
of the new technologies.
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The most common mistake is to use the machines
to emulate classroom procedures that have
come out of expediency, not thoughtful reflec¬
tion.
This is precisely why principles are
needed; a rationale, based on a fresh look at
what it is we are about, is the horse that
should pull the technological cart.24

Dwyer proposed five principles to be adhered to in the
design of computer learning experiences.2^

In doing so, he

echoes the spirit of student—controlled learning advocated by
Papert and Peelle in noting that each of his five principles
is "based on a belief in the value of learner control of certain
key aspects of his education.

The humanistic principles described by Dwyer have been
incorporated in a secondary National Science Foundation supported
mathematics educational project known as Project Solo.
project,

In this

the student engages in what Dwyer calls "learner-devised

processing" by writing, debugging, and executing computer
programs, and, at a higher level, engages in "learner-organized
processing" which involves program design and construction for
learners other than himself.2^
In examining the methodologies proposed by Papert, Peelle,
and Dwyer, we note two common sentiments.

On the negative side,

there is dissatisfaction with conventional CAI systems patterned
after the behavioristic model of learning.

On the positive side,

there is the intention to turn the power of the computer over
to the student and allow him to control and become responsible
for his own educational experience.

It should be added that

118
advocating student control does not necessarily banish
traditional CAI as a methodology.
not technique, which is paramount.
stances,

It is the issue of control,
Thus, under certain circum¬

the student may freely elect to initiate a CAI program

to guide his learning experience.

The most important restric¬

tion is that he maintain the option of changing that experience.
By stating that traditional CAI may be permitted within an
existential education, we have given an affirmative answer to
a question raised in the previous chapter.

There we pondered

the advisability of an existential educator utilizing the
methodology closely linked to an opposing philosophy of education.
(We assume that the computer is more closely associated with the
philosophies of realism and experimentalism.)

The important

qualification in this affirmative response is that the exis¬
tentialist has the sensitivity to detect and inhibit the "tail
wagging the dog" phenomenon.
That an existentialist may successfully utilize the techniques
of an opposing theory is illustrated by Bugental in his psycho¬
therapeutic practice.

Bugental, an existentialist, rejects the

psychoanalytic metapsychology of Freud, yet freely borrows clinical
techniques associated with Freudian psychoanalysis.

Bugental

properly credits the success of these techniques but specifically
comments that "In regard to these borrowings from psychoanalytic
theory,

it should be noted that I particularly emphasize the clinical
O o

aspects rather than the conceptual and theoretical."
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We conclude our discussion of methodology by emphasizing
that it would be presumptuous to state that the authors just
referenced are advocates of an existential philosophy of
education.

If a philosophical label were to be attached to

them, based on their writing, "humanistic experimentalist"
(in the spirit of John Dewey) seems most applicable.

Their

research is primarily concerned with the development of cogni¬
tive skills in students by placing them in humanistic, openended and stimulating environments which contain computers.
Although this paper does not examine their methodologies
in detail,

the reader is strongly encouraged to investigate the

references cited.

The philosophical position advocated in this

paper is existential, not experimental.

Therefore, the develop¬

ment of cognitive skills is perceived as secondary, and the
epistemology supporting the growth of cognitive skills is openended.

Yet, within the existential position, the development of

cognitive skills is very important.
position,

And speaking from this

this writer strongly endorses the methodologies men¬

tioned herein.

First, because they appear to be most promising

in promoting cognitive growth.

Second, and more importantly,

because they appear to do so without doing violence to the exis¬
tential concern with the subjective "I" in each student.
Therefore, while the aforementioned authors may be indifferent to
the existential position,

the existential educator may freely

adopt their proposed methodologies.
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. Administration
In considering the appropriate role of computer technology in
educational administration, we should begin by addressing the notion
of educational administration per se within the perspective of an
existential philosophy of education.

Unlike educational curriculum

and methodology, which must exist in some form, no matter how flexible
and open-ended, it is possible (and perhaps very desirable) to engage
in an educational experience without an administrative super¬
structure.

The classical one-room school house and many progressive

alternative schools function quite well without the services of
administrators.

(Let us say that an educational situation has an

administration when it utilizes administrators—individuals who are
not teachers in the sense of being directly involved with the student's
exposure and response to the curriculum—for example, superintendents,
principles,

counselors, security officers, etc.)

Recall that the existentialist is concerned with the individual
student and his immediate human "I - Thou" relationship with the teacher.
Therefore,

the existential educator is not sympathetic toward education

occurring within the context of a school system with its institutional,
organizational, bureaucratic structures.

Somehow, institutions, organi¬

zations, and bureaucracies tend to become self-serving entities in
which the individual is reduced to a cog in a mechanism for achieving
some collective goal.

It is within the context of system that schooling

becomes mistaken for education.

The student is perceived as raw

material entering the school system, being processed by that system,
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and outputed

(sic) in a mold specified by the requirements of our

economic institutions.
It is institutions, organizations, and bureaucracies that
basically need administering by some administration; ideally, indivi¬
duals require no such administration, and it is the administration of
a school system, not the individual student, that necessitates the
maintenance of an automated data processing system.
of this situation,

Therefore, in light

the existential educator may legitimately reject the

establishment of an administrative computing system.

In fact, to the

degree that the computer promotes systemization by making it possible,
the existentialist is likely to resist administrative data processing.
While acknowledging the validity of existential resistance to any
form of administrative data processing within an educational setting,
this author chooses to adopt a more qualified position, which is based
on the recognition that the essential problem is the institutionaliza¬
tion of the educational process, not automated data processing per se.
It is also based on the existential proposition that the educator must
realistically recognize the situation he finds himself in.

He is alive,

here and now, in twentieth century America, and education is encom¬
passed in bureaucratic structures.

A choice must then be made: either

to make a radical break with the institutionalized school, or try to
maintain an existential integrity "within the system.
is valid.

Either choice

The former would involve participation in an alternative

educational environment without an inhibiting administration, and thus
no administrative data processing.

The latter choice

the personal

choice of this writer—is not so clear-cut and requires some important
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qualification.
To begin with, the existential educator who chooses to become
involved with administrative computing should be aware that he must
maintain a delicate balance.

It is practically inconsistent, to be

philosophically opposed to systematized education, yet willing to
participate to a certain degree.

The author's resolution of this

situation involves the proposal of guidelines, not the presentation
of a tactical solution.
First, such an educator must remain aware of his philosophical
position.

If he is involved in an educational institution, his goal,

be it romantic and highly improbable, is the evolution of that insti¬
tution toward an existential environment.

While the attainment of

this objective may verge on the impossible, the only hope lies in
the second proposed guideline:

the educator's personal involvement

with his students must be of an existential nature.

Granting that

this may be very difficult, it should not be impossible.

The educator

can function in a humanly responsible manner toward his students,
regardless of the institution's failure to do so.
strength and hope of the existential creed.

Herein lies the

The individual educator

may not have it within his power to initiate a crusade toward institu¬
tional reform; but neither does the institution have ultimate control
over his decisions.

He does have the potential to make many decisions

and establish associations in a humanistically existential manner.
The institutional environment may work against this, while an alter¬
native environment may promote such.

Yet, in the same way that an

existential environment cannot guarantee that the individual educator
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will become existentially-oriented, neither can an institutional
environment necessarily inhibit the existential practice of the
committed educator.
We conclude this discussion of administrative data processing
within an existential education by stating that each independent
application must be closely examined and evaluated.

It seems

reasonable that there exists no danger in a school administration
employing computer technology to handle situations which may be
classified as logistical.

This would include such standard functions

as payroll, accounting, budgeting, and inventory control.

One should

view with strong suspicion any systems which could serve as a basis
for a data bank for student performance.

The potential negative impact

of such was specified in the previous chapter.

However, there is no

specific set of guidelines to follow.
Accordingly, the educator is bound to judge each application on
its own merits, and the environment in which it will be utilized.
This may place the educator in the position of making some very
difficult and unfavorable decisions.
do so.
of it.

Existentially, he is bound to

Ultimately, although he is within the system, he is not a part
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